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### Pakistan

#### Drone strikes are causing instability and terrorist backlash in Pakistan - creating a failed state syndrome and killing relations

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When Barack Obama took the oath of office three years ago, no one associated the phrase “targeted killing” with his optimistic young presidency. In his inaugural address, the 47-year-old former constitutional law professor uttered the word “terror” only once. Instead, he promised to use technology to “harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories.” Oddly, technology has enabled Obama to become something few expected: a president who has dramatically expanded the executive branch’s ability to wage high-tech clandestine war. With a determination that has surprised many, Obama has embraced the CIA, expanded its powers and approved more targeted killings than any modern president. Over the last three years, the Obama administration has carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, more than five times the 44 approved under George W. Bush. And after promising to make counterterrorism operations more transparent and rein in executive power, Obama has arguably done the opposite, maintaining secrecy and expanding presidential authority. Just as importantly, the administration’s excessive use of drone attacks undercuts one of its most laudable policies: a promising new post-9/11 approach to the use of lethal American force, one of multilateralism, transparency and narrow focus. Obama’s willingness to deploy lethal force should have come as no surprise. In a 2002 speech, Illinois State Senator Obama opposed Bush’s impending invasion of Iraq, but not all conflicts. “I don’t oppose all wars,” he said. “What I am opposed to is a dumb war.” And as president, in his December 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Obama warned, “There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” Since then, he has not only sent U.S. forces into Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, but also repeatedly approved commando raids in Pakistan and Somalia and on the high seas, while presiding over a system that unleashed hundreds of drone strikes. In a series of recent interviews, current and former administration officials outlined what could be called an “Obama doctrine” on the use of force. Obama’s embrace of multilateralism, drone strikes and a light U.S. military presence in Libya, Pakistan and Yemen, they contend, has proved more effective than Bush’s go-heavy approach in Iraq and Afghanistan. “We will use force unilaterally if necessary against direct threats to the United States,” Ben Rhodes, the administration’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, told me. “And we’ll use force in a very precise way.” Crises the administration deems indirect threats to the United States — such as the uprisings in Libya and Syria — are “threats to global security,” Rhodes argued, and will be responded to multilaterally and not necessarily by force. The drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the creation of a smaller, more agile U.S. military spread across Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East, are also part of the doctrine. So is the discreet backing of protesters in Egypt, Iran and Syria. The emerging strategy — which Rhodes touted as “a far more focused approach to our adversaries” — is a welcome shift from the martial policies and bellicose rhetoric of both the Bush administration and today’s Republican presidential candidates. But Obama has granted the CIA far too much leeway in carrying out drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. In both countries, the strikes often appear to be backfiring. Obama and other administration officials insist the drones are used rarely and kill few civilians. In a rare public comment on the program, the president defended the strikes in late January. “I want to make sure the people understand, actually, drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties,” Obama said. “For the most part, they have been very precise precision strikes against al Qaeda and their affiliates. And we are very careful in terms of how it’s been applied.” But from Pakistan to Yemen to post-American Iraq, drones often spark deep resentment where they operate. When they do attack, they kill as brutally as any weapon of war. The administration’s practice of classifying the strikes as secret only exacerbates local anger and suspicion. Under Obama, drone strikes have become too frequent, too unilateral, and too much associated with the heavy-handed use of American power. In 2008, I saw this firsthand. Two Afghan colleagues and I were kidnapped by the Taliban and held captive in the tribal areas of Pakistan for seven months. From the ground, drones are terrifying weapons that can be heard circling overhead for hours at a time. They are a potent, unnerving symbol of unchecked American power. At the same time, they were clearly effective, killing foreign bomb-makers and preventing Taliban fighters from gathering in large groups. The experience left me convinced that drone strikes should be carried out — but very selectively. In the January interview, Obama insisted drone strikes were used only surgically. “It is important for everybody to understand,” he said, “that this thing is kept on a very tight leash.” Drones, though, are in no way surgical. In interviews, current and former Obama administration officials told me the president and his senior aides had been eager from the outset to differentiate their approach in Pakistan and Afghanistan from Bush’s. Unlike in Iraq, where Democrats thought the Bush administration had been too aggressive, they thought the Bush White House had not been assertive enough with Afghan and Pakistani leaders. So the new administration adopted a unilateral, get-tough approach in South Asia that would eventually spread elsewhere. As candidate Obama vowed in a 2007 speech, referring to Pakistan’s president at the time, “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.” In his first year in office, Obama approved two large troop surges in Afghanistan and a vast expansion of the number of CIA operatives in Pakistan. The CIA was also given more leeway in carrying out drone strikes in the country’s ungoverned tribal areas, where foreign and local militants plot attacks for Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. The decision reflected both Obama’s belief in the need to move aggressively in Pakistan and the influence of the CIA in the new administration. To a far greater extent than the Bush White House, Obama and his top aides relied on the CIA for its analysis of Pakistan, according to current and former senior administration officials. As a result, preserving the agency’s ability to carry out counterterrorism, or “CT,” operations in Pakistan became of paramount importance. “The most important thing when it came to Pakistan was to be able to carry out drone strikes and nothing else,” said a former official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The so-called strategic focus of the bilateral relationship was there solely to serve the CT approach.” Initially, the CIA was right. Increased drone strikes in the tribal areas eliminated senior al Qaeda operatives in 2009. Then, in July 2010, Pakistanis working for the CIA pulled up behind a white Suzuki navigating the bustling streets of Peshawar. The car’s driver was later tracked to a large compound in the city of Abbottabad. On May 2, 2011, U.S. commandos killed Osama bin Laden there. The U.S. intelligence presence, though, extended far beyond the hunt for bin Laden, according to former administration officials. At one point, the CIA tried to deploy hundreds of operatives across Pakistan but backed off after suspicious Pakistani officials declined to issue them visas. At the same time, the agency aggressively used the freer hand Obama had given it to launch more drone strikes than ever before. Established by the Bush administration and Musharraf in 2004, the covert CIA drone program initially carried out only “personality” strikes against a preapproved list of senior al Qaeda members. Pakistani officials were notified before many, but not all, attacks. Between 2004 and 2007, nine such attacks were carried out in Pakistan, according to the New America Foundation. In 2008, the Bush administration authorized less-restrictive “signature” strikes in the tribal areas. Instead of basing attacks on intelligence regarding a specific person, CIA drone operators could carry out strikes based on the behavior of people on the ground. Operators could launch a drone strike if they saw a group, for example, crossing back and forth over the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In 2008, the Bush administration carried out 33 strikes. Under Obama, the drone campaign has escalated rapidly. The number of strikes rose steeply to 53 in 2009 and then more than doubled to 118 in 2010. Former administration officials said the looser rules resulted in the killing of more civilians. Current administration officials insisted that Obama, in fact, tightened the rules on the use of drone strikes after taking office. They said strikes rose under Obama because improved technology and intelligence gathering created more opportunities for attacks than existed under Bush. But as Pakistani public anger over the spiraling strikes grew, other diplomats expressed concern as well. The U.S. ambassador in Pakistan at the time, Anne Patterson, opposed several attacks, but the CIA ignored her objections. When Cameron Munter replaced Patterson in October 2010, he objected even more vigorously. On at least two occasions, CIA Director Leon Panetta dismissed Munter’s protests and launched strikes, the Wall Street Journal later reported. One strike occurred only hours after Sen. John Kerry, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had completed a visit to Islamabad. A March 2011 strike brought the debate to the White House. A day after Pakistani officials agreed to release CIA contractor Raymond Davis, the agency — again over Munter’s objections — carried out a signature drone strike that the Pakistanis say killed four Taliban fighters and 38 civilians. Already angry about the Davis case, Pakistan’s Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, issued an unusual public statement, saying a group of tribal elders had been “carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.” U.S. intelligence officials dismissed the Pakistani complaints and insisted 20 militants had perished. “There’s every indication that this was a group of terrorists, not a charity car wash in the Pakistani hinterlands,” one official told the Associated Press. Surprised by the vehemence of the official Pakistani reaction, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon questioned whether signature strikes were worthwhile. Critics inside and outside the U.S. government contended that a program that began as a carefully focused effort to kill senior al Qaeda leaders had morphed into a bombing campaign against low-level Taliban fighters. Some outside analysts even argued that the administration had adopted a de facto “kill not capture” policy, given its inability to close Bush’s Guantánamo Bay prison and create a new detention system. In April 2011, the director of Pakistan’s intelligence service, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, visited Washington in an effort to repair the relationship, according to news accounts and former administration officials. Just after his visit, two more drone strikes occurred in the tribal areas, which Pasha took as a personal affront. In a rare concession, Panetta agreed to notify Pakistan’s intelligence service before the United States carried out any strike that could kill more than 20 people. In May, after the bin Laden raid sparked further anger among Pakistani officials, Donilon launched an internal review of how drone strikes were approved, according to a former administration official. But the strikes continued. At the end of May, State Department officials were angered when three missile strikes followed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan. As Donilon’s review progressed, an intense debate erupted inside the administration over the signature strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal. Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the strikes should be more selective. Robert Gates, then the defense secretary, warned that angry Pakistani officials could cut off supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Clinton warned that too many civilian casualties could strengthen opposition to Pakistan’s weak, pro-American president, Asif Ali Zardari. The CIA countered that Taliban fighters were legitimate targets because they carried out cross-border attacks on U.S. forces, according to the former official. In June, Obama sided with the CIA. Panetta conceded that no drone strike would be carried out when Pakistani officials visited Washington and that Clinton and Munter could object to proposed strikes. But Obama allowed the CIA director to retain final say. Last November, the worst-case scenario that Mullen, Gates and Clinton had warned of came to pass. After NATO airstrikes mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Kayani demanded an end to all U.S. drone strikes and blocked supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. At the same time, popular opposition to Zardari soared. After a nearly two-month lull that allowed militants to regroup, drone strikes resumed in the tribal areas this past January. But signature strikes are no longer allowed — for the time being, according to the former senior official. Among average Pakistanis, the strikes played out disastrously. In a 2011 Pew Research Center poll, 97 percent of Pakistani respondents who knew about the attacks said American drone strikes were a “bad thing.” Seventy-three percent of Pakistanis had an unfavorable view of the United States, a 10-percentage-point rise from 2008. Administration officials say the strikes are popular with Pakistanis who live in the tribal areas and have tired of brutal jihadi rule. And they contend that Pakistani government officials — while publicly criticizing the attacks — agree in private that they help combat militancy. Making the strikes more transparent could reduce public anger in other parts of Pakistan, U.S. officials concede. But they say some elements of the Pakistani government continue to request that the strikes remain covert. For me, the bottom line is that both governments’ approaches are failing. Pakistan’s economy is dismal. Its military continues to shelter Taliban fighters it sees as proxies to thwart Indian encroachment in Afghanistan. And the percentage of Pakistanis supporting the use of the Pakistani Army to fight extremists in the tribal areas — the key to eradicating militancy — dropped from a 53 percent majority in 2009 to 37 percent last year. Pakistan is more unstable today than it was when Obama took office. A similar dynamic is creating even worse results on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Long ignored by the United States, Yemen drew sudden attention after a suicide attack on the USS Cole killed 17 American sailors in the port of Aden in 2000. In 2002, the Bush administration carried out a single drone strike in Yemen that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al Qaeda operative who was a key figure in orchestrating the Cole attack. In the years that followed, the administration shifted its attentions to Iraq, and militants began to regroup. A failed December 2009 attempt by a militant trained in Yemen to detonate a bomb on a Detroit-bound airliner focused Obama’s attention on the country. Over the next two years, the United States carried out an estimated 20 airstrikes in Yemen, most in 2011. In addition to killing al Qaeda-linked militants, the strikes killed dozens of civilians, according to Yemenis. Instead of decimating the organization, the Obama strikes have increased the ranks of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from 300 fighters in 2009 to more than 1,000 today, according to Gregory Johnsen, a leading Yemen expert at Princeton University. In January, the group briefly seized control of Radda, a town only 100 miles from the capital, Sanaa. “I don’t believe that the U.S. has a Yemen policy,” Johnsen told me. “What the U.S. has is a counterterrorism strategy that it applies to Yemen.” The deaths of bin Laden and many of his lieutenants are a step forward, but Pakistan and Yemen are increasingly unstable. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country of 180 million with resilient militant networks; Yemen, an impoverished, failing state that is fast becoming a new al Qaeda stronghold. “They think they’ve won because of this approach,” the former administration official said, referring to the administration’s drone-heavy strategy. “A lot of us think there is going to be a lot bigger problems in the future.” The backlash from drone strikes in the countries where they are happening is not the only worry. In the United States, civil liberties and human rights groups are increasingly concerned with the breadth of powers Obama has claimed for the executive branch as he wages a new kind of war. In the Libya conflict, the administration invoked the drones to create a new legal precedent. Under the War Powers Resolution, the president must receive congressional authorization for military operations within 60 days. When the deadline approached in May, the administration announced that because NATO strikes and drones were carrying out the bulk of the missions, no serious threat of U.S. casualties existed and no congressional authorization was needed. “It’s changed the way politicians talk about what should be the most important thing that a nation engages in,” said Peter W. Singer, a Brookings Institution researcher. “It’s changed the way we in the public deliberate war.” Last fall, a series of drone strikes in Yemen set another dangerous precedent, according to civil liberties and human rights groups. Without any public legal proceeding, the U.S. government executed three of its own citizens. On Sept. 30, a drone strike killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a charismatic American-born cleric of Yemeni descent credited with inspiring terrorist attacks around the world. Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American jihadist traveling with him, was killed as well. Several weeks later, another strike killed Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, also a U.S. citizen. Administration officials insisted a Justice Department review had authorized the killings but declined to release the full document. “The administration has claimed the power to carry out extrajudicial executions of Americans on the basis of evidence that is secret and is never seen by anyone,” said Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union. “It’s hard to understand how that is consistent with the Constitution.” After criticizing the Bush administration for keeping the details of its surveillance, interrogation and detention practices secret, Obama is doing the same thing. His administration has declined to reveal the details of how it places people on kill lists, carries out eavesdropping in the United States or decides whom to detain overseas. The administration is also prosecuting six former government officials on charges of leaking classified information to the media — more cases than all other administrations combined. Administration officials deny being secretive and insist they have disclosed more information about their counterterrorism practices than the Bush administration, which fiercely resisted releasing details of its “war on terror” and established the covert drone program in Pakistan. Obama administration officials say they have established a more transparent and flexible approach outside Pakistan that involves military raids, drone strikes and other efforts. They told me that every attack in Yemen was approved by Yemeni officials. Eventually, they hope to make drone strikes joint efforts carried out openly with local governments. For now, keeping them covert prevents American courts from reviewing their constitutionality, according to Jaffer. He pointed out that if a Republican president followed such policies, the outcry on the left would be deafening. “You have to remember that this authority is going to be used by the next administration and the next administration after that,” Jaffer said. “You need to make sure there are clear limits on what is really unparalleled power.” To their credit, Obama and his senior officials have successfully reframed Bush’s global battle as a more narrowly focused struggle against al Qaeda. They stopped using the term “war on terror” and instead described a campaign against a single, clearly identifiable group. Senior administration officials cite the toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi as the prime example of the success of their more focused, multilateral approach to the use of force. At a cost of zero American lives and $1 billion in U.S. funding, the Libya intervention removed an autocrat from power in five months. The occupation of Iraq claimed 4,484 American lives, cost at least $700 billion, and lasted nearly nine years. “The light U.S. footprint had benefits beyond less U.S. lives and resources,” Rhodes told me. “We believe the Libyan revolution is viewed as more legitimate. The U.S. is more welcome. And there is less potential for an insurgency because there aren’t foreign forces present.” In its most ambitious proposal, the administration is also trying to restructure the U.S. military, implement steep spending cuts and “right-size” U.S. forces around the world. Under Obama’s plan, the Army would be trimmed by 80,000 soldiers, some U.S. units would be shifted from the Middle East to the Pacific, and more small, covert bases would be opened. Special Forces units that have been vastly expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan would train indigenous forces and carry out counterterrorism raids. Declaring al Qaeda nearly defeated, administration officials say it is time for a new focus. “Where does the U.S. have a greater interest in 2020?” Rhodes asked. “Is it Asia-Pacific or Yemen? Obviously, the Asia-Pacific region is clearly going to be more important.” Rhodes has a point, but Pakistan and its nuclear weapons — as well as Yemen and its proximity to vital oil reserves and sea lanes — are likely to haunt the United States for years. Retired military officials warn that drones and commando raids are no substitute for the difficult process of helping local leaders marginalize militants. Missile strikes that kill members of al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan and Yemen do not strengthen economies, curb corruption or improve government services. David Barno, a retired lieutenant general who commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, believes hunting down senior terrorists over and over again is not a long-term solution. “How do you get beyond this attrition warfare?” he asked me. “I don’t think we’ve answered that question yet.”

#### Pakistan collapse causes nuclear war

Pitt ‘9 (William, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence.", “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” <http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183>, May 8, 2009)

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and use d artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

#### And Pakistan nukes are not secure

Gregory ’11 (Shaun, Director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford, UK, a professor who published widely on nuclear and security issues in Pakistan and advises many governments, their agencies, and international organizations, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4.6, <http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/131002/ichaptersection_singledocument/aa282522-4971-4513-a7ca-ec3afcd259be/en/Art+2.pdf>, accessed 10-26-11, June 2011)

Two high-profile attacks by terrorists on highly secure military bases in Pakistan, the first on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October 2009 and the second on the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran near Karachi in May 2011, have renewed international anxiety about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. This article addresses several worrying trends in Pakistan that are coming together to suggest that the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan may very well be compromised at some point in the future. The Growing Challenge of Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal In recent months, a variety of media sources have reported a significant escalation of nuclear weapons production by Pakistan. According to some of these sources, Pakistan has been building between 12 and 15 nuclear weapons a year, effectively doubling the size of its nuclear arsenal during the past three to four years to around 100 nuclear weapons.1 More disconcerting, Pakistan is engaged in a rapid expansion of its fissile material production through two new reactors, the Khushab II, thought to be operating in some form since 2009, and Khushab III, which has been under construction since 2005-2006 and is likely to come on-stream around 2013- 2014. There is further evidence from the respected Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security that a fourth Khushab reactor may also be under early phase construction.2 Intended primarily to offset rival India’s conventional military advantage, the open-ended escalation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production explains why Pakistan has led the opposition to the international Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a treaty which would cap fissile material stockpiles. Aside from the intricate politics of international arms control, the steady rise in the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal presents the rather more prosaic, though arguably more serious, challenge of ensuring the physical security of an ever increasing number of nuclear assets. This is not a simple matter. Safeguarding 100 weapons is a significantly greater challenge than safeguarding 50 weapons because strategic and operational realities require that those weapons are dispersed and that dispersal locations are adapted to the complex requirements of safely and securely storing nuclear weapons in various degrees of operational readiness.3 As Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal grows in the years ahead, these challenges will multiply. As many as 70,000 people in Pakistan reportedly have access to, or knowledge of, some element of the Pakistani nuclear weapons production, storage, maintenance, and deployment cycle, from those involved in the manufacture of fissile material, through those engaging in nuclear weapons design, assembly and maintenance, to those who transport and safeguard the weapons in storage and would deploy the weapons in crises.4 That number will also rise steadily as the size of the nuclear arsenal grows. This figure is important because of the complex and highly polarized debates about nuclear weapons safety and security in Pakistan. All sides of that debate agree that Pakistan has, with considerable U.S. assistance, put in place a range of robust measures to seek to assure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons. The consensus breaks down, however, on the issue of whether these measures provide adequate safety and security for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan Army, which has overall control of the weapons, and Pakistan’s government argue forcefully that they do, although even they have recently moderated their statements of reassurance.5 Critics point to a number of vulnerabilities that place these reassurances in some doubt. These vulnerabilities boil down to three core concerns: a) that the physical security of nuclear weapons—across the weapons cycle—may not be robust enough to withstand determined terrorist assault; b) that among the estimated 70,000 people with access to the nuclear weapons cycle, some may be willing to collude in various ways with terrorists;6 c) that the threat extends beyond terrorists gaining access to complete and viable nuclear weapons, and include the immense political and security implications of terrorists gaining access to fissile material, nuclear weapons components, or penetrating nuclear weapons facilities. A July 2009 article in the CTC Sentinel explained in detail the robust measures Pakistan has established to assure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons. It argued that terrorists have shown themselves able to carry out violent attacks at facilities that were reliably identified as having a nuclear weapons role. These facilities include the military complex at Wah, suspected to be involved in the manufacture of nuclear weapons parts; Kamra, suspected to be the designated base for the dispersal of nuclear assets in a crisis; and Sargodha, suspected to be a storage facility for nuclear delivery systems.7 In none of these cases, however, were the terrorist attacks themselves aimed at penetrating the bases or at seizing nuclear assets; rather, they were mass casualty bomb attacks that took advantage of the fact that Pakistani security personnel were concentrated and relatively static at base entry points as they waited to go through security barriers.8 Some analysts criticized the article, arguing that: a) terrorists in Pakistan had never shown themselves capable of penetrating high security bases; b) that the secrecy of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons sites would ensure that terrorists could not know the locations of the weapons. Within a few months, the validity of both these counterarguments would be seriously undermined when Pakistani militants penetrated the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. The Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters On October 10, 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi militants staged an audacious attack on the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi, arguably one of the most secure military complexes in Pakistan, housing within its sprawling campus not only the chief of army staff, but also many of Pakistan’s most senior military commanders, including the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the director-general of Strategic Forces Command (SFC)— Pakistan’s two most senior operational nuclear commanders. The modalities of this attack add up to a virtual blueprint for a successful attack on a nuclear weapons facility: - the penetration of layers of security checkpoints, barriers, and obstacles on the approach to the sensitive military site; - the terrorist use of army uniforms and—according to some reports—a military vehicle with appropriate license plates, and forged ID cards, to deceive checkpoint personnel; - the use of a safe house relatively close to the target site for several weeks before the operation to allow the buildup of a detailed intelligence picture; - the use of a “sensitive” map (or maps) of the GHQ to allow detailed operational planning. The use of this map (or maps) point to one of two main possibilities: either that the attack had inside help, or that this kind of sensitive information is poorly controlled by the Pakistan Army/ISI; - use of the kind of weaponry—smallarms, grenades and suicide vests— which allow final tier barrier defenses to be penetrated; - use of tactics that allow final tier barriers to be penetrated: grenades and/ or suicide detonations at entry points which then allow penetration by followup commando-style groups; - use of diversionary tactics: attacking one gate first to draw off and weaken the defenses at a secondary entry point, perhaps closer to the main objective.9 In all, at least 10 terrorists were involved in the operation, with four attacking the first gate, and a further six attacking the second gate. The terrorists gained entry to the complex where they took at least 40 people hostage. It took the Pakistan Army’s elite commandos, the Special Service Group (SSG), more than 20 hours to kill or capture all of the militants and free most of the hostages. Two civilians, seven Pakistani soldiers and five SSG commandos were killed in the raid. In the months that followed the assault, several other disturbing aspects about the attack emerged. Among these was the assertion that intelligence about the attacks had been known to Pakistan’s Punjab government well before October 10 and that this intelligence had even been published in two Pakistani newspapers, The News International and The Daily Jhang, four days before the attack, but had been ignored by the Pakistan Army and ISI.10 It also emerged that the terrorists had, ironically, almost certainly learned their tactics from the SSG, which had trained earlier generations of Pakistani/Kashmiri militants in similar tactics for operations against India. In addition, there was a concerted effort by the Pakistan Army and ISI to manipulate the media reporting of the attacks, forcing several private TV channels temporarily off the air, contradicting or retracting certain details, and seeking to play down the significance of the assault.11 The second set of features of the attack relate to secrecy, and they weaken the argument that Pakistan can ultimately rely on concealment to protect its nuclear assets. The use of “sensitive” maps in the attack, the time and proximity to conduct intelligence gathering, the level of knowledge of details such as uniforms, military plates, and possibly ID cards, point to a high level of terrorist knowledge of sensitive military information and protocols, whether through insider help or not. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of Pakistan’s security force movements and modus operandi has been a consistent feature of terrorist actions in Pakistan for many years, from the repeated assassination attempts against former President Pervez Musharraf, at least one of which included the insider involvement of Pakistani military officers,12 through the targeting of the ISI headquarters and vehicles,13 to the murders of senior military figures.14 Pakistan’s Nuclear Security at Risk In this context, given that nuclear weapons and delivery systems demand construction and other visible physical necessities (such as road widening, unusual levels of security, and bunker construction), and given that the growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal will significantly expand the construction of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the number of individuals with nuclearrelated roles, it is simply not possible that the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can remain unknown to terrorists in perpetuity.15 As evidence of this, on August 28, 2009, the U.S. Federation of American Scientists published the first open source satellite imagery of a suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor airbase outside Karachi.16 Within its perimeter walls, the satellite image shows three potential storage bunkers linked by looping roads.17 The fact that this image is available online, and that the unusual configuration of the base is clear, argues strongly that knowledge of the location of at least some nuclear weapons storage and other related facilities has reached terrorists in Pakistan. As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows, and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises, the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult. Terrorist groups have now shown themselves capable of penetrating even the most securely defended of Pakistan’s military bases and of holding space within those bases for many hours even against the elite SSG, more than enough time with the right equipment and sufficient numbers to carry out terrorist acts with enormous political or destructive pay-off, from video broadcasts with the attention of the world’s media, through potentially destroying by explosions nuclear weapons or materials and the creation of a radiological hazard, to the possibility of the theft of nuclear weapons components or materials for subsequent terrorist use. Indeed, on May 22-23, 2011, only about 15 miles from the suspected nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor, a major terrorist attack targeted the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in Karachi. Early reports suggest that between six and ten terrorists stormed the high security base from several entry points, that they had knowledge of the location of intruder detection cameras that they were able to bypass, and that they penetrated deep inside the base before using rocket-propelled grenades, explosives and small-arms to destroy several aircraft and take hostages. It took the base security and additional Pakistan Army rangers and commandos more than 18 hours to end the siege. At least 13 people were killed. A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear weapons storage facilities, which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons cycle, is no longer an implausible event. The successful location and penetration of such a site by terrorists, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in accessing nuclear assets, would itself be a transformative event both in terms of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship and in terms of international anxiety about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Such an assault would also critically undermine Pakistan’s reassurances about the security of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the weapons cycle, particularly in transit. As the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons inexorably continues to rise, and as the nuclear weapons security challenges thereby steadily multiply, the odds that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security will eventually be compromised continue to rise.

#### And it causes Indo-Pak escalation

**Clarke 4-17**-13 [Michael, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at Griffith Asia Institute with a special focus in terrorism, Griffith University, Bachelor of Arts (Honors) in Asian and International Studies, “Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?” Comparative Strategy, 32:2, 98-114, online]

A delegative system has been construed as holding the potential to open the door for¶ nuclear terrorism. It is possible to envisage a scenario in which a terrorist organisation¶ would seek to instigate an India-Pakistan crisis in order to compel Islamabad to deploy¶ part of its nuclear arsenal. Given Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear inferiority vis-a-vis `¶ India, Islamabad maintains a nuclear ﬁrst use posture to maintain a credible deterrent.¶ The circumstances in which Pakistan would resort to nuclear ﬁrst use are also ambiguous,¶ with Lieutenant-General Khalid Kidwai, the director-general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans¶ Division (SDP), stating in 2002 that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if it perceived that¶ India had crossed four major “thresholds”: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part¶ of its territory (space threshold); India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces¶ (military threshold); India proceeds to the economic “strangling” of Pakistan (economic¶ threshold); and India undertakes large-scale internal subversion of Pakistan to destabilize¶ it (domestic threshold).48

#### Indo-Pak war causes global nuclear winter- MAD breaks down

**Hundley ’12** [Tom, senior editor at the Pulitzer Center, MA in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania, former National Endowment for the Humanities journalism fellow at the University of Michigan, was a newspaper journalist for 36 years, including nearly two decades as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, “Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” 9-5-12, <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-cold-war>]

Pakistan, however, seems to have embraced this discarded strategy and is now, in effect, challenging India to a game of nuclear chicken -- which seems to have made India tread carefully. Tellingly, in 2008, when Lashkar terrorists attacked Mumbai, Cold Start was not implemented. These days, Indian officials seem to be backing away from the idea. "There is no Cold Start doctrine. No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff remark from a former chief of staff. I have been defense minister of the country. I should know," veteran Indian politician Jaswant Singh assured me. In a WikiLeaked classified document dated Feb. 16, 2010, Tim Roemer, then U.S. ambassador to India, described Cold Start as "a mixture of myth and reality" that, if implemented, "would likely encounter very mixed results."¶ Pakistani military planners, however, continue to be obsessed with the idea of Cold Start. It comes up in every conversation about security, and it is the driving force behind the country's program to develop tactical battlefield nukes. For now, the focus is on missile delivery systems, but according to Maria Sultan, director of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, an Islamabad think tank, there is growing interest in using nukes in other ways -- such as to create an electromagnetic pulse that would fry the enemy's electronics. "In short, we will look for full-spectrum response options," she said.¶ The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed.¶ Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse."¶ Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately.¶ What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve.¶ This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

#### The plan is key to effective drone usage-

#### 1) Host Country-

#### Ending drones key to host country cooperation

Streeter ’13 (Devin C. Streeter, Helms School Of Government, Liberty University “Boko Haram, Drone Policy, And Port Security: Issues For Congress”, [http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S.\_Drone\_Policy\_Tactical\_Success\_and\_Strategic\_Failure](http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S._Drone_Policy_Tactical_Success_and_Strategic_Failure)shaw), April 19, 2013)

A new set of drone operating procedures would help to repair international relations and decrease civilian casualties. Furthermore, nations like Yemen, Somalia, and others, will not feel threatened and will readily accept U.S. assistance in counterterrorism efforts.¶ 78¶ Cooperation with affected nations will ensure that their sovereignty is not violated¶ 79¶ and the use of human intelligence programs will reduce civilian casualties, thus resulting in a sanitary, more effective drone operation.¶ 80¶ While the U.S. drone program has many noteworthy tactical successes, it simultaneously has suffered various strategic failures. Collateral damage has directly strained our relations with Pakistan, and indirectly stressed our relations with Europe, Asia, and South America. However, by increasing joint cooperation and decreasing civilian casualties, the harms inflicted on international relations can be reconciled. If this new system is implemented, not only will United States policy makers see the radical decrease of innocent deaths, but they will also see a decrease in terrorism and the terrorist recruiting pool.¶ 81¶ Confronting this issue and establishing a new set of standard operating procedures should be on the forefront of every elected official’s agenda, for the purpose of improving foreign policy and repairing international relations.

#### Host country cooperation key

Cordesman ’13 (Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, “The Common Lessons of Benghazi, Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arab Spring”, <http://csis.org/publication/common-lessons-benghazi-algeria-mali-tunisia-egypt-syria-iraq-yemen-afghanistan-pakistan>, January 28, 2013)

Working with Regional and Host Country Partners The third lesson is that in most cases the United States will find that the key partner will not be a European ally but either a regional partner or the host country itself. The internal dynamics of the host country that will determine what real world opportunities exist at what mix of costs and benefits. If the host country lacks the willingness and absorption capability to use U.S. and allied aid, the default setting should be containment not intervention. It is a grim reality that regardless of the humanitarian cost, there is little point in trying to help countries that cannot help themselves and creating a culture of dependence that shifts that responsibility to the United States or some outside power. More broadly, the United States should learn that it needs to work through local governments on their terms and rely on local allies that share a common religion and value system with the host or target country. This is particularly true because much of the reason for the rebirth of religious values throughout the Islamic world has come from the failure of secular governance. U.S. strengths consist of helping nations and nonstate actors deal with secular problems and needs, but the United States will always face major obstacles when it comes to dealing with Islam and different cultural values. This is why allies like the southern Gulf states, Arab states, Turkey and other states with largely Islamic populations will be key partners at both the regional and national level. They can act in ways the United States and other outside powers cannot. They do not bring the burden of western secularism, ties to Israel, or the history of European colonialism to a given problem. They also do not bring the baggage of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan or the war on terrorism. Moreover, such partnerships are necessary because the United States must also work with its regional allies to help them to maintain or achieve their own internal stability and to limit the risk of the political upheavals that are underway in so many states. Patient diplomatic and advisory efforts to help allied and friendly countries make their own reforms in areas like economics and governance will be key sources of stability and evolutionary change. So will assistance in creating effective counterterrorism forces and internal security efforts, as will support to regional security structures like the Gulf Cooperation Council.

#### 2) Targeted strikes key to effective strikes

**Dunn and Wolf ’13** [Dr David Hastings Dunn is Reader in International Politics and Head of ¶ Department in the Department of Political Science and International Studies ¶ at the University of Birmingham, UK, Chairman of the ¶ West Midlands Military Education Committee, winner of the the UK’s Political Studies Association’s ¶ Best Article in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations in ¶ 2009 Prize, and Stefan Wolff, PhD, is Professor of International Security at the University of ¶ Birmingham in the UK, “Drone Use in Counter-Insurgency and CounterTerrorism: Policy or Policy Component?” <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHR_2-13_Hitting_the_Target.pdf#page=89>]

The use of drones as weapons has evolved naturally from their use as reconnaissance vehicles. Tasked to gather information on enemy movements, their on-board optics and ability to loiter made them ideal platforms for such a role, providing an unparalleled degree of surveillance over large areas and for long periods of time, generating data that could subsequently inform ground- and air-combat operations. The time gap between gathering and analysing information, and acting on it, however, diminished significantly once drones became armed, enabling a much more immediate response to this operational intelligence. Yet **an important distinction needs to be drawn** here between acting on operational intelligence that corroborates existing intelligence and confirms the presence of a specific pre-determined target and its elimination – so-called ‘targeted strikes’ (or less euphemistically, ‘targeted killings’) – and acting on an algorithmic analysis of operational intelligence alone, determining on the spot whether a development on the ground suggests terrorist activity or association and thus fulfils certain (albeit, to date, publicly not disclosed) criteria for triggering an armed response by the remote pilot of a drone – socalled ‘signature strikes’.6¶ Targeted strikes rely on corroborating pre-existing intelligence: they serve the particular purpose of eliminating specific individuals that are deemed crucial to enemy capabilities and are meant to diminish opponents’ operational, ¶ tactical and strategic capabilities, primarily by killing mid- and top-level leadership cadres. To the extent that evidence is available, it suggests that ¶ targeted strikes are highly effective in achieving these objectives, while ¶ simultaneously generating relatively little blowback, precisely because they target individual (terrorist) leaders and cause few, if any, civilian casualties. ¶ This explains, to a significant degree, why the blowback effect in Yemen – where the overwhelming majority of drone strikes have been targeted strikes ¶ – has been less pronounced than in Pakistan and Afghanistan.7¶ Signature strikes, in contrast, can still be effective in diminishing operational, ¶ tactical and strategic enemy capabilities, but they do so to a certain degree by ¶ chance and also have a much higher probability of causing civilian casualties. ¶ Using drones for signature strikes decreases the dependence on pre-existing ¶ intelligence about particular leaders and their movements and more fully ¶ utilises their potential to carry out effective surveillance and respond to ¶ the conclusions drawn from it immediately. Signature strikes have been the ¶ predominant approach to drone usage in Pakistan and Afghanistan.8¶ Such strikes have had the effect of decimating the rank and file of the Taliban and their associates – but they have also caused large numbers of civilian casualties and, at a minimum, weakened the respective host governments’ ¶ legitimacy and forced them to condemn publicly, and in no uncertain terms, ¶ the infringement of their states’ sovereignty by the US. In turn, this has strained already difficult relations between countries which have more ¶ common than divergent interests when it comes to regional stability and ¶ the fight against international terrorist networks. That signature strikes have ¶ a high probability of going wrong and that such failures prove extremely ¶ counterproductive is also illustrated by a widely reported case from Yemen, ¶ in which twelve civilians were killed in the proximity of a car identified as ¶ belonging to an Al-Qa’ida member.9¶ The kind of persistent and intimidating presence of a drone policy geared ¶ towards signature strikes, and the obvious risks and consequences involved ¶ in repeatedly making wrong decisions, are both **counterproductive** in themselves **and corrosive** of efforts that seek to undercut the local support enjoyed by insurgent and terrorist networks, as well as the mutual assistance ¶ that they can offer each other. Put differently, signature strikes, in contrast ¶ to targeted killings, do anything but help to disentangle the links between ¶ insurgents and terrorists.¶ Counter-insurgency as a strategy works best by providing security on the ¶ ground (deploying soldiers amongst the community that they are intended to ¶ protect) and establishing and sustaining a s ufficiently effective local footprint ¶ of the state and its institutions providing public goods and services beyond ¶ just security (water, food, sanitation, healthcare, education and so forth). ¶ This strategy is often encapsulated in the formula ‘clear, hold, build’,10 and ¶ it needs to go hand-in-hand with pursuing a viable political settlement that ¶ addresses what are the, in many cases, legitimate concerns of those fighting, ¶ and supporting, an insurgency. By living among the communities they seek ¶ to secure, soldiers can win their trust, stem support for the insurgents, and ¶ understand who their enemies are, what their demands and objectives are, ¶ and how best to single out those who represent an irreconcilable threat ¶ to the community. In other words, in a context in which the objective is ¶ to protect innocent civilians, win over reconcilable insurgents and their ¶ supporters, and eliminate those who are irreconcilable, drones can deliver ¶ specific contributions to an overall counter-insurgency policy. Yet this can only happen if drones target individuals for a reason, rather than being used, ¶ and perceived, as a blanket approach against an entire community. It is important to bear in mind, in this context, that the success of ¶ counter-insurgency, in part, lies in the above-mentioned transition from a ¶ predominantly military footprint, with some civilian tasks being performed ¶ by soldiers, to a predominantly civilian footprint that includes a military ¶ component to secure gains made in restoring public services and law and order. This is essential because it counters a similar tactic used by insurgents ¶ and terrorists. In Yemen, for example, territorial gains made by Al-Qa’ida ¶ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) initially garnered a lot of local public ¶ support precisely because they not only drove government forces out of ¶ areas in southern Yemen, but because they also provided basic services to ¶ communities.¶ Yet, as the imposition of Sharia Law became locally less and less popular, tribal ¶ resistance, targeted drone strikes and a government offensive succeeded in ¶ retaking most of the territory gained by AQAP and holding it in the course ¶ of 2012. At the same time, AQAP operations became much more localised, ¶ not only in the sense that the organisation has not been able to mount any ¶ transnational operations, but also in the sense that it has ceased attacks ¶ on Western interests and targets in Yemen, concentrating its remaining ¶ capabilities on attacks against Yemeni military and security officials.11¶ Data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Long War Journal¶ for 2012 puts the number of US drone strikes in Yemen at around forty, with ¶ almost 200 militants and around thirty-five civilians killed. In terms of the ¶ number of strikes and enemy combatants killed, this represents a significant ¶ increase compared to previous years: for the three years prior, less than ¶ half the number of strikes were confirmed, and just over half the number of ¶ militants were reportedly killed, while the number of civilian casualties was ¶ approximately a third higher, albeit with none reported in 2011.12¶ Drones, thus, were part of a broader, and, to date, successful, campaign ¶ against AQAP in Yemen. The challenge for the Yemeni government now is to ¶ make the transition from a military presence that secures and holds these ¶ territories to a more civilian one that builds up services and legitimacy, while ¶ at the same time seeking a political settlement with the southern secessionists ¶ through the nascent process of the UN-mediated National Dialogue. Unless, ¶ and until, that happens, the gains of 2012 are easily reversible. By definition, ¶ preventing a reversal of these gains cannot be accomplished by drones. ¶ Indeed, using unmanned aerial platforms to constantly look for signifiers of ¶ terrorist and insurgent activity is almost the antithesis of counter-insurgency. ¶ Civilian casualties, which have a much higher probability as a result of ¶ signature strikes, alienate and radicalise the local population and only serve ¶ to increase the active and passive support that such communities are likely ¶ to offer both terrorists and insurgents.¶ Once civilian casualties mount, they create an important negative legacy ¶ effect. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, the ¶ average civilian casualty rate from US drone strikes in Yemen since the ¶ inception of the policy there is around 6 per cent, comparable to the 2011 ¶ average for Pakistan, which was 5.5 per cent.13 In the case of Pakistan, this represented a significant decline from the 2008 peak of almost 60 per cent.14¶ Yet even more than four years after a significant decline in civilian casualties, ¶ US drone strikes remain deeply unpopular in the country,15 far more so than ¶ in Yemen.16 As noted earlier, the majority of these strikes in Pakistan were ¶ signature strikes; those in Yemen targeted strikes. While both were effective ¶ in reducing insurgent and terrorist capabilities, their broader consequences ¶ in Pakistan have been more negative both domestically and in terms of USPakistani relations than they were in Yemen.¶ To put it differently, using drones for long periods over isolated communities ¶ is almost an invitation for trouble in a variety of ways, including, crucially, ¶ the fact that the psychological, physical and cultural distance between ¶ the operators and their observed community is likely to contribute to ¶ misinterpretation and misperception, and thus to the killing of innocent ¶ civilians.¶ Remote observation offers none of the experience, associated with traditional ¶ counter-insurgency campaigns, that can generate cultural sensitivity and the ¶ building of trust and empathy. Instead it offers a sanitised form of surveillance ¶ where the act of killing is dehumanised for both the killers and the killed. ¶ Drone strikes of this nature act on suspicions rather than verified intelligence ¶ and their operation offers no sense of feedback to their operators. Their ¶ remoteness is not just physical: the secrecy with which these programmes ¶ operate and the lack of accountability to the communities over which they ¶ operate means that there is neither a legal nor an emotional cost involved in ¶ getting things wrong.¶ Given that drones, if deployed with sensitivity and clear purpose, can make ¶ a significant and useful contribution to counter-insurgency and counterterrorist campaigns as illustrated by the discussion of the case of Yemen, the ¶ key challenge for policy-makers is to avoid getting things wrong, and having ¶ to live with the consequences of doing so, as is the case with Pakistan. Micah ¶ Zenko draws the conclusion that US drone policy needs to be reformed with ¶ a focus away from signature strikes and towards targeted killings of a limited ¶ number of terrorists with transnational capabilities and intent.17 Similarly, ¶ Joshua Foust argues that for drones to be effective, they must be part of a broader strategic framework.18 This is a sensible proposal with which the ¶ authors generally agree as far as such drone strikes are considered in the ¶ context of counter-terrorist efforts aimed at preventing attacks against the ¶ US and its (and more generally Western) interests abroad.¶ Yet, as has been argued, it is difficult to separate (transnational) terrorist ¶ networks from more localised insurgencies in which the former often ¶ successfully embed themselves. To the extent that drone strikes can ¶ disrupt these links, they can strengthen governments’ counter-insurgency efforts and contribute to establishing environments in which insurgents ¶ are accommodated into political and social processes that reduce the ¶ opportunities for terrorist networks to find bases from which they can ¶ operate. Using drones, from that perspective, is less about limiting their ¶ deployment in principle, but about making sure that they are an element ¶ of a broader policy of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency – not a ¶ substitute for it.¶ the number of strikes and begin a process of taking drones out of the hands of the CIA.

#### 3) The aff makes the Pakistan army effective and stops *refugee flows*- key to solve

Dawn ‘9 (Dawn Editorial, “Drone attacks”, <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/145308>, May 8, 2009)

Republican Congressman Ronald Earnest Paul`s query to the House regarding the legitimacy of US drone-bombing in Fata comes not a moment too soon. The matter is of pivotal significance in the Pakistani forces` efforts to contain the terrorism emanating from the area, and is a divisive factor in the debate over how the issue must be tackled. The justification offered earlier was that Pakistan appeared helpless against the rising tide of militancy and terrorism. But now the army has launched renewed offensives in the militant-infested areas and reports suggest that gains are being achieved. Meanwhile, public opinion is turning against the militants, with many in the citizenry now demanding that no stone be left unturned in bringing them to book. In this situation, the continuing US drone incursions are robbing our security forces of some of their moral legitimacy and are, in fact, undermining the war effort. For one thing, as Mr Paul pointed out, the drone incursions violate the rights of a sovereign country. Given that the US is not at war with Pakistan — and, in fact, the two countries are partners in what was earlier referred to as the `war on terror` — the US cannot claim legitimacy in unilaterally launching offensives against militants whom the Pakistan military has already engaged in serious combat. The repeated US violations of the country`s territorial integrity subvert our government`s efforts to make this `Pakistan`s war` and lend currency to the extremists` claim that Pakistan is merely a pawn in what is, essentially, America`s war. Secondly, the US bombings have resulted in a large number of civilian casualties which, in the public`s mind, outweigh by far any success against the militants. America`s actions stand in danger of being viewed as wanton foreign aggression against innocent populations. And the drone strikes are contributing to the increasing number of refugees fleeing the area. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army and other security forces continue to suffer heavy casualties in the battles underway on our western borders.

#### 4) The aff wins the hearts and the minds and liberal society

Afzal ’13 (Madiha Afzal, Brookings, Nonresident Fellow, Global Economy and Development, “Drone Strikes and Anti-Americanism in Pakistan”, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/07-drones-anti-americanism-pakistan-afzal>, February 7, 2013)

As President Obama’s second term gets underway, his administration must engage with Pakistan on the issue of U.S. drone strikes. Following the appointment and confirmation of John Kerry as Secretary of State and the appointment of John Brennan as CIA director, the time is right to revisit this issue. Senator Kerry spearheaded a huge civilian aid program to Pakistan in 2009 through the “Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill”, and John Brennan has seen through more than 242 drone strikes in Pakistan since 2009 as the architect of the Obama administration’s drone program. Both men know Pakistan well, and it is now time for them to work together to make Pakistanis understand the U.S. drone program. The debate on whether drone strikes increase anti-Americanism in Pakistan is ongoing, with the most vocal opponents of drones arguing that they increase recruitment for terror organizations. Opponents argue that this mainly happens in two ways: first, drones can give radicals ammunition for recruiting those on the margin of becoming terrorists. But such individuals are enemies of the United States in any case, and would likely remain so, whether the U.S. is actively engaged in drone strikes or not. The second argument is that drones may convert entirely non-radical individuals into joining terrorist groups since non-radical individuals could become riled up by the havoc wreaked by U.S. drone strikes. However, this is frankly hard to imagine. It is quite plausible that individuals might be radicalized if drone strikes were to harm their families, friends or communities. However, if one argues that the only effect of drone strikes is to increase radicalization, the policy prescription which emerges is either to do nothing, or to scrap the drone program. But the drone program is here to stay, so the policy so far has been to do and say nothing. What is getting overlooked in the debate is that drone strikes are infuriating the more moderate and liberal segments of Pakistani society, those who have traditionally been more sympathetic toward the United States. Imagine a group of well-educated people, many of whom attended English-language schools, are widely exposed to American and Western media, and like and embrace many aspects of American culture. These people have probably had some sort of personal interaction with the West, through tourism, attending college abroad, or through family members or friends who live in the U.S. What bothers this group about U.S. drone strikes, more than the attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty, is the perceived American hypocrisy toward the importance of Pakistani lives and deaths. Following the horrific school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in December, a piece in the U.K. newspaper The Guardian titled “In the U.S., mass child killings are tragedies. In Pakistan, mere bug splats” went viral among educated Pakistanis. In addition, coverage of a recent report on drone strikes in Pakistan by researchers at NYU and Stanford law schools, which recounts the daily terror facing those who live in areas where drones strike, gained wide circulation in Pakistan. Few cared to note that this report had been written by an advocacy group and that some of its statistics were suspect. While the New America Foundation, the Long War Journal, and the London Bureau of Investigative Journalism all compile statistics on drone strikes, the numbers differ, and it bothers this liberal, educated group of Pakistanis that the U.S. government does not release its own data on drone strikes. One of the only public acknowledgments on this issue was in a 2012 speech by John Brennan when he stated that there were barely any civilian deaths as a consequence of these strikes. This struck many as implausible, further angering Pakistanis. Why does anger against America from this group of liberal, educated Pakistanis matter? After all, it is highly unlikely that any of these people will turn radical. These people matter because they form the heart of an active civil society in Pakistan, which the U.S. counts on to serve as a counterweight to the radical segments of Pakistani society. They work in the Pakistani government, media and business sectors, and drone strikes are driving these people toward a constant distrust of the U.S. and hardening their attitudes against America. It undermines all the positive work the United States is doing in Pakistan, all the aid dollars it spends there, and drastically undercuts U.S. soft power in the region. If America loses these hearts and minds, it will lose the battle for Pakistan. Where does this group of Pakistanis get its information? It buys into the only narrative out there, offered up by the outspokenly anti-American Pakistani media, which argues that drone strikes are callously undertaken without any regard for civilian casualties. This view overinflates the number of civilians killed by drone strikes, especially women and children, and underreports the number of militants killed. And without an official account of events from the U.S. government, this narrative can easily be exploited and promoted.

### Hegemony

#### The plan pre-empts backlash that outweighs the plan- solves international credibility key to effective drone strikes

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In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below. The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal capabilities of its drones. Although many of its plans are classified, the U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and costly factor—the human being.70 Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the technology in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71 History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space. In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies.

#### Drone usage causes international backlash that undermines hegemony

Streeter ‘13 (Devin C, Director of Activities, Public Relations, and Recruitment at Liberty University Strategic Intelligence Society, “US Drone Policy: Tactical Success and Strategic Failure,” [http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S.\_Drone\_Policy\_Tactical\_Success\_and\_Strategic\_Failure, April 19](http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S._Drone_Policy_Tactical_Success_and_Strategic_Failure,%20April%2019), 2013)

The first category of nations, while not targeted by drone strikes, is intimidated by their capabilities. India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and over 40 other nations have announced intentions to acquire drones. 27 The main producers of unmanned aerial vehicles are the United States, Israel, and China. 28 The United States, while the leader in drone use and production 29 , must deal with “American export controls.” 30 Israel, however, has fewer restrictions, considering China’s acquisition of drone technology by buying an “anti-radar attack drone” 31 from the small nation. China in turn has offered to sell lower grade drones to the international community. 32 It is unlikely that drone technology will go unshared for long. 33 In essence, the United States has sparked a miniature arms race and has intimidated nations with the threat of a new, superior technology. Governments that have begun pursuing their own UAV programs have shown a notable bitterness to the United States for its unchecked use of drones. 34 Nations such as China, Japan, Russia, and Brazil all disapprove of United States drone policies by over 30 percentage points. 35 To them, the United States seems heavy handed and brutish; holding back technology while indiscriminately using it against our enemies. The lack of consideration and cooperation is a negative influence on world leaders. At the same time, other nations feel that drones violate their airspace and are used without approval from the international community. 36 The majority of these nations fall within the boundaries of the European Union, and while their disapproval is not as notable as the first group, it often reaches the double digits rate. 37 Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and other European Union members do not understand the ‘fire from the hip’ mentality of drone strikes. 38 The European Council on Foreign Relations noted “it [United States] seems to interpret the concept of imminence in a rather more permissive way than most Europeans would be comfortable with.” 39 The European Union fully supports drones in combat support and reconnaissance roles, but has issues with the concept of targeted killings, which often result in collateral damage. 40 European leaders desire an international consensus on how drones should be operated, before more civilians become casualties. 41 The European Council on Foreign Relations further notes: The Obama administration has so far chosen to operate by analogy with inter-state war, but in an era marked by the individualization of conflict, this seems like an outdated approach. 42 Europe does not share the mentality of drone strikes with "acceptable" collateral damage and apolicy that is not accountable to the international community. As a result, relations with Europe have reached a critical point. 43 European nations, alienated by the Obama administration’s progressive dialogue but aggressive drone policy, 44 are ready to try and take the lead in international relations. 45 Germany in particular will be a key nation as it increases in prominence among European states. 46 Hans Kundnani, a well-known journalist and political pundit, notes, “Obama is extremely popular in Germany, but Berlin’s deeply-held views on the use of military force… have the potential to create a Europe-America split.” 47 Kundnani also states, “A ‘special relationship’ is developing between China and Germany.” 48 Because of anti-drone sentiment, long-time U.S. allies grow increasingly distant, to the point of forming new relationships with China. This is a direct threat to the United States’ place in international relations and a direct challenge to its hegemony. If the relations with Europe are to be fixed, a change in drone protocol is needed.

#### Credibility is the vital internal link into all foreign policy objectives- military capability is irrelevant to hegemony

CSIS ’11 (Center for Studies in International Security, Joint-Research Project, Jon B. Alterman, Ernest Z. Bower, Victor D. Cha, Heather A. Conley, Stephen J. Flanagan, Bonnie S. Glaser, Michael J. Green, Andrew C. Kuchins, Haim Malka, Teresita C. Schaffer, Craig S. Cohen, “Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power Capacity and Resolve”, June 2011)

This study looks at foreign assessments of U.S. power over the next ten years, the primary drivers of such views, and the implications of these assessments for sustained U.S. leadership in the coming era. Most see the United States in decline relative to rising powers like China but do not see a fundamentally new order emerging in the next decade. Foreign expectations of U.S. power remain great. Over the long term, the main worry is not U.S. capacity, but U.S. resolve and competency. In Asia, this study examines Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, and Indian views of U.S. power. The United States is in a strong position in Asia although this is not assured. Countries are watching carefully the U.S. capacity for economic regeneration and Washington’s enduring commitment to the region. Regional demands on U.S. power are only likely to increase during this period of increasing limitations and constraints. In the Middle East, this study looked at Israeli and Gulf views of U.S. power. The study finds that a powerful United States that deemphasizes the region could cause profound realignment, but a diminished United States committed to the region could shape order for decades to come. It is too early to know whether Washington’s management of the Arab Spring, NATO’s engagement in Libya, or the Israel-Palestinian conflict will dislodge Iraq and Iran as the main tests of U.S. power. In Eurasia, this study looked at Russian, Turkish, and German views of U.S. power. The alliance politics of the Cold War are clearly over. Germans and Turks have diminished faith in U.S. leadership. They do not deny U.S. capabilities, but they are more willing to challenge U.S. policy, which they view as misaligned with national objectives. Russians have tempered their pessimistic views of U.S. power and look more cautiously now at multipolarity. In Eurasia, U.S. policy is seen as the critical independent variable. Few consulted for this study saw great likelihood in regional powers bandwagoning successfully against the United States in the next decade or a single regional power confronting the United States in a “Suez moment” in which U.S. power is shown to be lacking. China and Iran create their own antibodies, which push neighbors closer into Washington’s orbit. The risks to the U.S. position associated with the rise of regional powers may thus be somewhat overstated. Similarly, few believed nonstate actors had the potential to erode U.S. primacy on their own in the next decade. Recent events demonstrate, however, that the current order is not static or easily managed. Despite this turbulence, the world is still largely welcoming of U.S. leadership. It expects it, and it is afraid to lose it. The greatest challenge may thus come not from external forces, but from a divided, insular, less confident United States. […] Perceptions matter. When Washington acts—whether to bolster an ally, eliminate a safe haven, or remove a terrorist leader or dictator—the stakes are high. The fruits of success or pains of failure are not limited to a single policy objective. With the United States, there is always a demonstration effect, a global reverberation that shapes views of American power abroad. This phenomenon is not limited to U.S. engagement overseas. Other nations watch U.S. domestic politics almost as closely as they watch their own. The rest of the world knows that the United States is entering a period of intense fiscal pressure. Even defense spending has entered a period of greater scrutiny. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked in Abilene, Kansas, in 2010, “the gusher has been turned off,” not to be turned on again for some time. 1 U.S. technological leadership may be assured for the near future, but there is an increasing feeling that the scientific foundation critical to U.S. economic and national security is eroding at a time when that of other nations is gaining strength. 2 How the world interprets this new period has the potential to affect U.S. relations and standing in the world for decades to come. If other nations anticipate that U.S. power will be constrained in coming years, a new and potentially more dangerous strategic landscape could emerge for the United States. For example, if regional powers judge the United States to be weakened, they will be less willing to compromise on issues of importance to Washington. Similarly, there could be serious consequences to the United States if long-standing allies in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East begin to question America’s security guarantees or if they judge Washington to be unable or unwilling to solve regional or global problems. 3 This volume looks at how tightening budgets and other key influencers on U.S. power could damage U.S. interests in the years ahead. How do foreigners perceive the likely trajectory of U.S. power over the next ten years, and what are their primary reasons for such views? The ten chapters that follow focus on how changes in thinking about the United States today could lead to changes in foreign behavior tomorrow in three critical regions. Given these changes, do we have the insight and skill to use our military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to manage this turbulent period? How can Washington credibly signal strength in a time of greater austerity?4 Writing about foreign assessments of U.S. power is a difficult exercise given Washington’s global reach and the constant challenge of determining the significance of events to others. At the time of this writing, NATO planes are bombing Libya. Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria continue at various stages of success. The Middle East peace process looks stalled. Japan is reeling from March’s tsunami, still struggling to contain the nuclear radiation from its damaged reactors. European allies are financially weakened, and powers like China are on the rise. Despite the killing of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and al Qaeda fight on, prolonging the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. Washington teetered for months on the verge of a government shutdown, seemingly unable to reconcile necessary long-term austerity measures with near-term politics. For those looking for tests of U.S. capacity and resolve, one need not search far and wide. In fact, the United States has been engaged in a robust debate since the end of the Cold War on the limits and uses of U.S. power. 5 The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the preeminent power, but it strangely was also a time of deep worry about U.S. decline. 6 By the late 1990s, the nature of the current order had begun to take shape. The National Intelligence Council’s first Global Trends report, issued in 1996 to forecast trends up to 2010, is illustrative of this period; it concluded that between 1996 and 2010 “no country, no ideology, and no movement will emerge on a global scale to threaten U.S. interests or to build and sustain an anti-Western coalition.”7 As the 1990s continued and the United States began to be perceived as the lone superpower, America attracted antibodies that were difficult at first to detect. The Bush administration took office debating what to do with American primacy. U.S. allies were concerned that the United States would become less engaged globally, ironic considering the image of U.S. “hyperpower” that would come to dominate. 8 Al Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the equation. America’s response to these attacks—including the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the global war on terror—threw in sharp relief the unipolarity of the current system and intensified the debate over U.S. power. At first, the quick toppling of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime in the face of international opposition led to a rush of triumphalism and belief in America’s unfettered empire. 9 This quickly receded as Iraqis responded to the U.S. intervention with a violent insurgency. The war in Iraq became a turning point in how the world saw the United States. 10 The run-up to the war left allies with the impression that the United States would not be bound by rules it created. The execution of the postwar period made enemies aware of the susceptibility of American military power to asymmetric threats. The pictures emerging from Abu Ghraib damaged Washington’s moral authority that had been built up over decades. The intensity of focus on Iraq left other parts of the world feeling neglected or else free to act without American concert. 11 And yet, efforts to gauge global attitudes toward the United States prior to the surge in Iraq in 2007 when things were at their darkest demonstrated that much of the world viewed U.S. power through their regional interests rather than through the lens of Iraq. 12 Today, the burden to define and demonstrate American leadership remains great because it appears so frequently in question. It is common to hear from policy, academic, and media that the United States is overextended abroad and indebted at home and that U.S. primacy is receding as we move toward a multipolar world. In absolute terms, the evidence is mixed. 13 Understandably, President Obama rejects this narrative, arguing frequently that the U.S. economy, military, and diplomacy as well as the ideational power of the American dream remain unmatched globally. 14 Few politicians want to be associated with managing U.S. decline. To accept this fate risks charges of defeatism: forecasting U.S. decline tends to be characterized by opponents as a self-fulfilling prophesy. 15 Members of the Obama administration came to power believing the biggest problem they faced was this idea that the United States was no longer leading internationally. 16 James Steinberg, the first deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration, said, “Our credibility and leadership were shot, either because we were too unilateral or we weren’t dealing with what we needed to deal with.”17 Obama’s team has actively sought to counter this idea, stressing its “different conception of U.S. leadership . . . [that] leadership should galvanize an international response, not rely on a unilateral U.S. response.”18 Critics have dubbed this “leading from behind.”19 The extraordinary events in the Middle East in 2011 have only reenergized this debate on the character, capacity, and limitations of American leadership. Both parties have tried over the past two decades to use the fear of U.S. decline to argue for their own distinct policy preferences. There is historical precedent to this. Political leaders made similar arguments after Sputnik’s launch and during Japan’s economic success of the 1980s. Nothing sparks national ambition like the fear of falling behind. In this way, the United States is not facing anything new. But as former secretary of state Colin Powell has said, it is unprecedented that “a developing nation is now the financier of the richest nation on earth. That doesn’t mean we’re in decline, but it’s probably not a good thing either.”20 At such a unique and dynamic time, it is important to critically reexamine how we understand and anticipate events abroad, including the trajectory of certain key countries and their views and expectations of U.S. power.

**Heg prevents European conflict, destabilizing proliferation, Asian war, and great power conflict**

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A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier willyield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, **the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship**, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Congress is key to that signal

Ellison ’13 (Keith Ellison, “Time for Congress to build a better drone policy”, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-13/opinions/36311903_1_drone-strikes-drone-program-drone-policy>, January 13, 2013)

An unmanned U.S. aerial vehicle — or drone — reportedly killed eight people in rural Pakistan last week, bringing the estimated death toll from drone strikes in Pakistan this year to 35. As the frequency of drone strikes spikes again, some questions must be asked: How many of those targeted were terrorists? Were any children harmed? And what is the standard of evidence to carry out these attacks? The United States has to provide answers, and Congress has a critical role to play. The heart of the problem is that our technological capability has far surpassed our policy. As things stand, the executive branch exercises unilateral authority over drone strikes against terrorists abroad. In some cases, President Obama approves each strike himself through “kill lists.” While the president should be commended for creating explicit rules for the use of drones, unilateral kill lists are unseemly and fraught with hazards. When asked about the drone program in October during an interview on the “The Daily Show,” the president said, “One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in, but any president’s reined in terms of some of the decisions that we’re making.” It’s time to put words into action. Weaponized drones have produced results. They have eliminated 22 of al-Qaeda’s top 30 leaders and just last week took out a Taliban leader. Critically, they lessen the need to send our troops into harm’s way, reducing the number of U.S. casualties. Yet the costs of drone strikes have been ignored or inadequately acknowledged. The number of innocent civilian casualties may be greater than people realize. A recent study by human rights experts at Stanford Law School and the New York University School of Law found that the number of innocent civilians killed by U.S. drone strikes is much higher than what the U.S. government has reported: approximately 700 since 2004, including almost 200 children. This is unacceptable. Another cost is how drone strikes are shaping views of the United States around the world. You might develop a negative attitude toward the United States if your only perception of it is a foreign aircraft buzzing over your house that occasionally fires missiles into your neighborhood. In Pakistan, where 95 percent of U.S. drone strikes have occurred, people familiar with them overwhelmingly express disapproval (97 percent, according to Pew polling from June) and believe they kill too many innocent people (94 percent). Drone strikes may well contribute to the extremism and terrorism the United States seeks to deter. U.S. drone use has also lowered the threshold for the use of lethal force in foreign countries. Would we fire so many missiles into Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia if doing so required sending U.S. troops into harm’s way? Our drone policy must be guided by more than capability. It must be guided by respect for noncombatants, necessity and urgency. It is Congress’s responsibility to exercise oversight and craft policies that govern the use of lethal force. But lawmakers have yet to hold a single hearing examining U.S. drone policy. Any rules must provide adequate transparency, respect the rule of law, conform with international standards and prudently advance U.S. national security over the long term. In codifying a legal framework to guide executive action on drone strikes, Congress should consider these steps: First, we must do more to avoid innocent civilian casualties. The Geneva Conventions, which have governed the rules of war since World War II, distinguish between combatants and noncombatants in the conduct of hostilities and state that civilian casualties are not acceptable except in cases of demonstrated military necessity. This is the standard we must follow. Second, Congress must require an independent judicial review of any executive-branch “kill list.” The U.S. legal system is based on the principle that one branch of government should not have absolute authority. Congress should object to that concentration of power, especially when it may be used against U.S. citizens. A process of judicial review would diffuse executive power and provide a mechanism for greater oversight. Third, the United States must collaborate with the international community to develop a widely accepted set of legal standards. No country — not even our allies — accepts the U.S. legal justification for targeted killings. Our justification must rest on the concept of self-defense, which would allow the United States to protect itself against any imminent threat. Any broader criteria would create the opportunity for abuse and set a dangerous standard for other countries to follow, which could harm long-term U.S. security interests. The United States will not always enjoy a monopoly on sophisticated drone technology. The Iranian-made drone that Hezbollah recently flew over Israel should compel us to think about the far-reaching implications of current policy. A just, internationally accepted protocol on the use of drones in warfare is needed. By creating and abiding by our own set of reasonable standards, the United States will demonstrate to the world that we believe in the rule of law.

### Solvency

#### Text: The United States Congress should substantially increase restrictions on the use of signature strikes by the President of the United States.

#### Plan solves credibility and U.S. drone effectiveness

**Zenko ’13** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, online]

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared:¶ “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in¶ binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a¶ vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of¶ America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under¶ President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they¶ will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations¶ for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the¶ Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism¶ practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately¶ be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone¶ strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure¶ by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all¶ uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international¶ humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers;¶ and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by¶ limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted¶ (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total¶ number of strikes would significantly decrease).¶ The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone¶ use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms¶ by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates¶ that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone¶ strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of¶ its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the¶ extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use¶ of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping.¶ Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to¶ protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented¶ domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are¶ vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage,¶ and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they¶ occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion¶ on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S.¶ support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent¶ to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced¶ interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S.¶ drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies,¶ emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes¶ occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone¶ strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent),¶ Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan¶ (83 percent).67¶ This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone¶ strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes¶ require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such¶ states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone¶ strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced,¶ and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is¶ not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its¶ U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships¶ were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in¶ late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing¶ the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a¶ staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could¶ attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant¶ investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships,¶ conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing¶ downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to¶ China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks¶ on the ground that are critical for identifying targets.¶ According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance—¶ such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones—¶ is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to¶ either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking¶ Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood¶ of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place,¶ political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed¶ drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North¶ Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region.¶ To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and¶ necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in¶ each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the¶ United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.¶ The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal¶ capabilities of its drones. Although many of its plans are classified, the¶ U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and¶ Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)¶ sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early¶ stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost¶ certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and¶ navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense¶ environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability¶ to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior¶ official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in¶ nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim¶ that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal¶ force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying¶ degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and¶ costly factor—the human being.70¶ Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are¶ becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and¶ autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could¶ possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the technology¶ in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the¶ Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama¶ revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight¶ checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for¶ me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology¶ may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71¶ History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities¶ is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used¶ them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as¶ legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers¶ and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation¶ and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not¶ hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize¶ already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would¶ be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S.¶ drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept¶ norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve¶ Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for¶ developing such a framework would be based in existing international¶ laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and¶ distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone¶ strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of¶ cyber and space.¶ In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed¶ drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine¶ core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting¶ human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would¶ be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone¶ deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability¶ for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps¶ more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer¶ heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent¶ advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors¶ would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States¶ and its allies.

#### Clear Congressional restrictions are key to effective counter-terror policy- solves future enforcement, executive overreach, and operational certainty

**Cronogue ‘12** [Graham, graduate of the Duke University School of Law, where he served as an¶ Executive Editor for the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law and an Articles¶ Editor for the Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, BA in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror,” <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=djcil>]

Though the President’s inherent authority to act in times of emergency ¶ and war can arguably make congressional authorization of force ¶ unnecessary, it is extremely important for the conflict against al-Qaeda and ¶ its allies. First, as seen above, the existence of a state of war or national ¶ emergency is not entirely clear and might not authorize offensive war ¶ anyway. Next, assuming that a state of war did exist, specific congressional ¶ authorization would further legitimate and guide the executive branch in ¶ the prosecution of this conflict by setting out exactly what Congress ¶ authorizes and what it does not. Finally, Congress should specifically set out what the President can and cannot do to limit his discretionary authority and prevent adding to the gloss on executive power. ¶ Even during a state of war, a congressional authorization for conflict ¶ that clearly sets out the acceptable targets and means would further ¶ legitimate the President’s actions and help guide his decision making ¶ during this new form of warfare. Under Justice Jackson’s framework from ¶ Youngstown, presidential authority is at its height when the Executive is acting pursuant to an implicit or explicit congressional authorization.74 In ¶ this zone, the President can act quickly and decisively because he knows ¶ the full extent of his power.75 In contrast, the constitutionality of ¶ presidential action merely supported by a president’s inherent authority ¶ exists in the “zone of twilight.”76 Without a congressional grant of power, ¶ the President’s war actions are often of questionable constitutionality ¶ because Congress has not specifically delegated any of its own war powers ¶ to the executive.77¶ This problem forces the President to make complex judgments ¶ regarding the extent and scope of his inherent authority. The resulting uncertainty creates unwelcome issues of constitutionality that might hinder the President’s ability to prosecute this conflict effectively. In timesensitive and dangerous situations, where the President needs to make splitsecond decisions that could fundamentally impact American lives and ¶ safety, he should not have to guess at the scope of his authority. Instead, Congress should provide a clear, unambiguous grant of power, which would mitigate many questions of authorization. Allowing the President to ¶ understand the extent of his authority will enable him to act quickly, ¶ decisively but also constitutionally. ¶ Finally, a grant or denial of congressional authorization will allow Congress to control the “gloss” on the executive power. There is considerable tension between the President’s constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and Congress’s war making powers.78 This tension is ¶ not readily resolved simply by looking at the Constitution.79 Instead courts look to past presidential actions and congressional responses when evaluating the constitutionality of executive actions.80 Indeed Justice ¶ Frankfurter noted in Youngstown that “a systematic, unbroken, executive ¶ practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before ¶ questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the ¶ President by § 1 of Art. II.”81 Thus, congressional inaction can be deemed as implicit delegation of war making power to the executive.82 Whether the United States is in a state of war or not, an authorization ¶ of force provides legitimacy and clarity to the war effort. If the President acts pursuant to such an authorization his authority is at its height; consequently, he can operate with greater certainty that his actions are ¶ constitutional.83 Absent such a declaration, the President’s power is much less clear. While the President has the authority to frame the conflict and he might still be able to act pursuant to his inherent powers, he is operating in the zone of twilight.84 Congressional authorizations remove this uncertainty by stamping specific acts with congressional approval or disapproval. This process also allows Congress to exert control over what the President can do in the future and prevents the “gloss” that comes from congressional acquiescence.85¶ III. PROBLEMS WE FACE TODAY ¶ The AUMF authorized the President to use “all necessary and ¶ appropriate force” against all actors that he determined were involved in ¶ the 9/11 attacks.86 The nexus requirement tethered military action to this ¶ specific event and those involved in the attacks.87 In 2001, this hastily ¶ passed statute adequately addressed America’s principal security concerns, ¶ namely al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. However, as time ¶ passes and the war on terror expands to new groups and regions, the ¶ connection to these attacks is becoming more and more tenuous. The ¶ United States faces threats not just from al-Qaeda, but also from its allies ¶ and cobelligerents, many of whom seemingly have no relation to 9/11. ¶ Moreover, the exact scope and appropriate use of this force remains undefined. Though the President has interpreted “force” to include ¶ detention and targeted killings and has applied it to American citizens at ¶ home and abroad, these actions are immensely controversial.88 The AUMF ¶ does little to help clear up these problems.

#### Congressional action is necessary to prevent Obama circumvention and future executive overreach

**Cohen ’12** [Michael A. Cohen is a fellow at the Century Foundation, “The Imperial Presidency: Drone Power and Congressional Oversight,” July 24, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12194/the-imperial-presidency-drone-power-and-congressional-oversight>]

Ironically, however, the administration stands on firmer legal ground here than it did on Libya. It has used the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) granted in 2001 by Congress to justify nearly every aspect of these operations, including targeted killing campaigns carried out by both the military and the CIA, and the continued detention of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan. As Yale Law School professor Bruce Ackerman told me, “The AUMF was a response to a real problem, namely the attacks of Sept. 11. It is now being transformed into a tool for fighting a 100-year war against terrorists.”¶ ¶ In a sense we are witnessing a perfect storm of executive branch power-grabbing: a broad authorization of military force giving the president wide-ranging discretion to act, combined with a set of tools -- drones, special forces and cyber technology -- that allows him to do so in unprecedented ways. And since few troops are put in harm’s way, there is barely any public scrutiny.¶ ¶ Congress has the ability to stop these excesses. On Libya, it possessed the power to turn off the financial spigot and cut off funding, and indeed, there was a tepid effort in the House of Representatives to do so. On the AUMF, Congress could simply repeal it or more realistically modify it to take into account the new battlefields in the war on terror. Finally, it could conduct greater oversight, in particular public hearings, of how the executive branch is utilizing military force. But not only has Congress not taken these steps, in deliberations over the National Defense Authorization Act earlier this year, it tried to expand the AUMF. On the use of drones and targeted killings, Congress has made little effort to demand greater information from the White House and has not held any public hearings on either of these issues. As Micah Zenko recently noted, claims “that congressional oversight of targeted killings exclusively by the intelligence committees in closed sessions is adequate” are “indefensible.”¶ The reasons for congressional abdication are legion. Partisanship plays an important role. For example, from 2001 to 2006, Republicans largely abstained from overseeing a Republican White House’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ Since a Democrat became president, however, congressional oversight and scrutiny of the administration in terms of foreign policy has remained underwhelming, if not nearly as bad. Meanwhile, the White House has treated Congress dismissively and even with contempt. Historically, strong institutional prerogatives have been a check on such parochialism -- think William Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s apostasy on Vietnam or even the bipartisan Iran-Contra hearings in the 1980s. Today, however, few in Congress have shown much interest in upholding even its most basic foreign policy responsibilities. Quite simply, there are no Frank Churches or even Russ Feingolds in Congress anymore. ¶ ¶ But there are also serious institutional obstacles to enhanced congressional scrutiny. Writing in the Harvard National Security Journal (.pdf), Andru Wall argues that much of the problem with congressional oversight can be traced to an antiquated understanding of how national security operations are actually carried out. At a time of greater interagency cooperation and coordination between the military and intelligence agencies, Congress still sees these functions as somehow discrete.¶ As Greg Miller noted in the Washington Post in December, “Within 24 hours of every CIA drone strike, a classified fax machine lights up in the secure spaces of the Senate Intelligence Committee, spitting out a report on the location, target and result. The outdated procedure reflects the agency’s effort to comply with Title 50 requirements that Congress be provided with timely, written notification of covert action overseas. There is no comparable requirement in Title 10, and the Senate Armed Services Committee can go days before learning the details of JSOC strikes. Neither panel is in a position to compare the CIA and JSOC kill lists or even arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the rules by which each is assembled.”¶ In addition, oversight responsibilities are often bifurcated by separate authorization and appropriation processes. The 9/11 Commission recommended ending this dysfunctional arrangement among intelligence committees and creating a single joint intelligence committee with both authorizing and appropriating responsibilities. Nearly 10 years later, it still hasn’t happened.¶ ¶ If history is any guide, so long as Congress fails to hold the president’s feet to the fire, the executive branch will take on more responsibilities that are outside the purview of Congress’ prying eyes. Ackerman called such “legislative irresponsibility and executive unilateralism” a self-perpetuating phenomenon that is a “recurrent dynamic in presidential systems.” With the lack of any strong institutional pride in Congress, an executive branch that for obvious reasons prefers less oversight and the advent of new tools for fighting America’s wars, this situation is likely to get worse before it gets better, if it ever does.

#### Courts fail at drone restrictions- Congress is key for multiple reasons

**Hansen ’11** [Victor M. Hansen, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at New England Law, Boston, served a 20-year career in the Army, most of that time as a JAG Corps officer, B.A. Brigham Young University, J.D. Lewis and Clark Law School, LL.M. The Judge Advocate General's School, served as an associate professor of law at The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, “Predator Drone Attacks,” New England Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 27-36, 2011, online]

Contrast the unsuitability of the judicial branch to provide useful and¶ effective oversight with Congress’s ability to fulfill that role. Structurally,¶ the Constitution envisions an active and robust role for Congress in foreign¶ policy, national security and military matters. Congress has the express¶ power to, among other things, “provide for the common Defence,”27¶ “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules¶ concerning Captures on Land and Water,” “raise and support Armies,”28¶ “provide and maintain a Navy,”29 and “make Rules for the Government¶ and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”30 Even though the President¶ may enjoy certain advantages over Congress when it comes to directing the¶ operational aspects of national security, by design the framers did not¶ make policymaking easy. Slowness is the point: under the Constitution,¶ congressional involvement and oversight is supposed to create obstacles to¶ unfettered executive action, absent some exigent circumstances.31¶ Congress also enjoys a long history of involvement in national security¶ and military matters. As early as 1789, Congress asserted itself as a¶ wartime decision-­‐‑maker by passing legislation instructing that U.S. troops¶ be governed by the rules that Congress established.32 By the early¶ nineteenth century, Congress had established an extensive statutory¶ landscape that governed the military establishment and executive powers¶ over the military, such as the President’s ability to call forth the militia¶ during conflict. During the Civil War, Congress passed a series of¶ Confiscation Acts in an effort to pressure President Lincoln to act more¶ aggressively toward the southern states.33 During World War I, Congress¶ aggressively set boundaries for war and military action through the¶ Neutrality Acts.34 In the midst of the Vietnam War, Congress stepped in to¶ regulate military operations in Indochina by forbidding the use of funds to¶ further military action in Laos or Thailand.35 In 1973, Congress passed the¶ War Powers Resolution, designed to limit the President’s authority to continue the use of force beyond ninety days if Congress had not approved¶ such an engagement in hostilities in the interim time.36 During the¶ administration of President Gerald Ford, Congress enacted the Tunney¶ Amendment, which restricted spending in Angola for any purpose other¶ than intelligence.37 Congress enacted several measures during the Clinton¶ Administration governing the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia,¶ Herzegovina, and Somalia, even in the midst of armed conflict.38 This very¶ brief list amply illustrates the point that not only does Congress have the¶ constitutional authority to involve itself in national-­‐‑security matters, but¶ also that it has exercised that authority throughout our history.¶ Unlike the courts, Congress has the institutional resources to engage in effective oversight. Congress is not limited by a case-­‐‑or-­‐‑controversy¶ requirement, and its examination can focus on both the policy and legal¶ questions surrounding the drone strikes.39 Congress also has the authority¶ to conduct hearings and investigations into the drone program. Congress¶ can subpoena material, and individual members of Congress can visit the¶ military theater where the drone strikes are taking place. Members of Congress can consult with military commanders, diplomats, representatives of foreign governments, and others about the drone¶ program. Congress can also appoint independent advisors and experts to inform it on various aspects of the drone program. This institutional structure stands in stark contrast to that of the judicial branch, which lacks¶ virtually all of these resources.¶ In addition, unlike the courts, Congress is a political branch and is¶ responsive to an electorate.40 Because all members of the House of¶ Representatives and one-­‐‑third of the Senate face elections every two years,¶ Congress must be attuned to the interests of their constituencies. If the¶ electorate is skeptical or concerned about the President’s use of drone¶ attacks, then members of Congress, acting out of self-­‐‑interest and self-­‐‑¶ preservation will be more politically motivated to place a check on the¶ President’s actions. For all of these reasons, Congress is the branch best¶ suited to place controls on the President􀈂s use of drone attacks. C. The Scope of the AUMF¶ The fact is that Congress has already placed some controls on the¶ President’s use of drone attacks in the form of the 2001 Authorization to¶ Use Military Force (“AUMF”).41 Weeks after the attacks of 9-­‐‑11, Congress¶ passed a Joint Resolution, which gave the President the authority:¶ to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,¶ organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,¶ committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on¶ September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in¶ order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against¶ the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.42¶ The AUMF is unquestionably a broad grant of authority and it was¶ tantamount to a declaration of war against al-­‐‑Qaeda and the Taliban in¶ Afghanistan. It was not, however, a blank check for the President.43 The¶ text of the AUMF itself suggests that Congress intended to limit the¶ President’s authority to terrorist activity related to the 9-­‐‑11 attacks with the¶ stated objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United¶ States.44¶ The key question is: just how open-­‐‑ended was the grant of authority?¶ Does it include al-­‐‑Qaeda and Taliban safe havens in Pakistan that may not¶ have existed before 9-­‐‑11 but only came into existence after American and¶ NATO forces entered Afghanistan? Does the AUMF authorize targeting of¶ individuals like al-­‐‑Awlaki, who may not have played any role in the 9-­‐‑11¶ attacks, but who have become radicalized since that time and who are now¶ supporting future terrorist attacks against the United States? Does it¶ authorize force in countries like Yemen that have so far either been¶ unwilling or unable to eliminate terrorist cells within its borders?¶ The actions of both the Bush and Obama Administrations suggest that¶ they believe the AUMF gave them a very broad grant of authority that¶ includes the use of drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and¶ perhaps elsewhere in the Middle East where the President perceives a¶ threat. That may or may not be so, but because the authorization came¶ from Congress; it is up to Congress to place limits on the President if it¶ believes he has exceeded his authority. III. Future Actions¶ Limits on a president’s power can take many forms. It could include¶ amending the AUMF to make clear exactly what actions Congress is¶ willing to authorize. Congress could reduce, eliminate, or place conditions¶ on funding predator drones to narrow the circumstances where they can be¶ employed. Congress could also revoke the AUMF and force the President¶ to come back to Congress for more specific authorizations to use force.¶ These and a host of other tools are available to Congress if it wants to check¶ the President’s use of drone attacks.¶ This is not to suggest that the AUMF in its current form specifically¶ authorizes drone attacks or that additional limits on the President’s¶ authority are needed. The point is simply this: if the President’s use of¶ drone attacks is to be checked, Congress must take action. The debate in¶ the international arena over the legality of these attacks under international¶ law, interesting though it is, is primarily an academic discussion. Certainly¶ the impetus behind this debate is to use international law as a mechanism¶ to check the unbridled actions of the United States, or any state for that¶ matter. The fact remains, however, that the law in this area is uncertain at¶ best. In the face of this uncertainty, it is highly unlikely that the United¶ States, or any country, would restrain its actions if it believed that such¶ restraint was not in its best interest.¶ Any checks on the President’s use of drone attacks must come¶ domestically. In the domestic arena the two options are either the courts or¶ Congress. As discussed above, the courts are institutionally unsuited and¶ incapable of providing appropriate oversight. Congress is the branch with¶ the constitutional authority, historical precedent, and institutional capacity¶ to exercise meaningful and effective oversight of the President’s actions.

## 2AC

#### 1. Interpretation – the aff should get to weigh its impacts against the kritik

#### This is good -

#### A. Plan focus – otherwise discussion gets shifted away from the topic

#### B. Ground – They moot 9 minutes of 1AC offense – makes debate lop sided and unproductive

#### C. Vague alts and floating piks are a reason to reject the critique – make the neg a moving target and lets them coopt aff offense

#### D. Pragmatic Congressional action on [signature strikes/drone reform] is critical to garner support and open up space for larger structural change.

Naiman 2012

Robert, policy director at Just Foreign Policy and president of Truthout's board of directors, A Reformist Strategy to Downsize the Drone Strike Policy, http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/12987-a-reformist-strategy-to-downsize-the-drone-strike-policy

I want to talk about what Congress could do about drone strikes in the next one to two years. To begin with, some political context, as I see it. First, I don't think anyone will argue with me if I say that for the last ten years, Congress has done very little. Second, I think it would be extremely helpful if Congress would do something. I think Congress doing something is intrinsically important in itself, in addition to whatever the thing is. The reason is that the media, the public and the administration take cues from what Congress is talking about. If Congress isn't talking about something, then it's perceived as not very controversial. More people would contact Congress if we had a vehicle for them to contact Congress about. Third, I don't think it's as hard for Congress to do things on this as some people seem to think. There's a kind of conventional wisdom that Congress can't do anything because no one cares because no US soldiers are being killed by the policy. I think this conventional wisdom is completely wrong. No US soldiers are being killed in Honduras, and yet,100 members of Congress are willing to sign letters about human rights in Honduras, and these letters get press and pressure the administration. No US soldiers are being killed in Bahrain, but members of Congress are willing to sign letters about human rights in Bahrain, and these letters get press and pressure the administration. Conversely, plenty of US soldiers were killed in Afghanistan before 2009, and Congress didn't do much about that. So, whether or not American soldiers are being killed is not as decisive as some people seem to think. Fourth, there's another conventional wisdom that Congress can't do anything because most Americans support the policy. But in fact, most Americans have no idea what the policy is, so to say that they support it is kind of meaningless. To the extremely limited extent that the administration has deigned to share information publicly, it has made two central claims: that drone strikes are narrowly targeted on top-level terrorist leaders, and that civilian casualties have been extremely rare. The record of independent reporting suggests that these two claims are, as President Obama might put it, the biggest whoppers of the drone strike policy. So, if the public believes that it supports the policy, what the public is in fact supporting is a policy whose only official public notice has been two big whoppers, a policy that does not actually exist in reality on Planet Earth. When the American people find out what the real policy is, I am sure that they will not support it. This is why strategies to force an increase in transparency are key to reforming the policy. Five, I think that a large part of the reason that not much has happened has just been a question of focus. Between 2001 and 2009, very little happened in Congress on the war in Afghanistan. People were focused on the war in Iraq. When troops were drawn down from Iraq and escalated in Afghanistan, people started to focus on Afghanistan, and Congress started taking action. Now that troops are being drawn down from Afghanistan, we have an opportunity to focus on drone strikes. Sixth, Obama is re-elected. That's done. That should create more political space. The shadow of the election will no longer be hanging over all deliberations. Seventh, the issue has gotten much more press attention recently, by which I mean not just reporting on drone strikes, but reporting in detail on specific, particularly egregious and publicly indefensible aspects of the policy, such as attacks on rescuers. Eighth: months ago, we got 26 signers on the Kucinich-Conyers signature strike letter, and that was without a lot of pushing from a lot of groups. (A policy permitting signature strikes, revealed by the Washington Post in May, allows drone pilots to fire on people based on behavior patterns - or "intelligence signatures" - without being required to know the person's identity.) It looks like there are more folks ready to push now. Ninth, it's very likely to be more useful to have a lot of members do something more modest, than to have very few members do something profound. It's more likely to get press; it's more likely to produce the impression that the policy is controversial; it's more likely to show that members care; it's more likely to produce a change in policy. If we can win some changes in the policy, that will prove that the policy can be changed by outside pressure, and that will open space for further reform. Tenth: therefore, in terms of potential Congressional action, we need to look for realistic, pragmatic things that we could do to reform the current drone strike policy by making it smaller. At least some of these things should be things that we can engage people outside the Beltway on, because that's going to lead to a lot more public education and mobilization. So, here are five ideas that we could push. Other ideas are circulating. I think the most important thing at this point is to develop a group of people who are committed to trying to do something realistic and useful. But to start the discussion, here are five ideas that I think are realistic and useful: 1. The Washington Post editorial board has called for the CIA to be taken out of the business of operating weaponized drones. Human Rights Watch made the same call a year ago and reaffirmed this call in April. The program would be declassified, the military is more transparent and accountable to US and international law than the CIA, and the CIA would refocus on its core competence and responsibility of intelligence and analysis. It is a dangerous conflict of interest for the CIA to be running a paramilitary program at the same time as it is responsible for analyzing, reporting to and advising the president on the impact of US policy. As CIA director, Gen. David Petraeus asked for the CIA to have more armed drones. A good first step would be for Congress to say no to this request. The next permanent head of the CIA faces a Senate confirmation hearing. The next head of the CIA could be pressed to oversee getting the CIA out of drone strikes completely as a condition of Senate confirmation. 2. It has been reported in the press and by independent researchers that the administration has targeted rescuers with "secondary" or "follow-up" strikes, and that these strikes have (predictably) killed civilians. Targeting rescuers is illegal under international law, regardless of whether it takes place in a legal conflict or not. The US ambassador to Pakistan has denied that the United States is targeting rescuers or engaging in secondary strikes. Congress could codify the US ambassador's denial by stating that it is US policy not to target rescuers or engage in secondary strikes. Congress could also press administration officials to testify about this policy, on the public record. At the confirmation hearing of the next CIA head, senators could be urged to ask sharp questions about secondary strikes and attacks on rescuers, and be urged to use the confirmation process as leverage to press for ending attacks on rescuers and secondary strikes. 3. When we were in Pakistan on a recent delegation, the (then-acting) US ambassador acknowledged to us that the United States has an official count of the number of civilians it thinks have been killed in Pakistan, and that this number is classified. Congress could ask why this number is classified and press for it to be declassified. Shuja Nawaz of the nonpartisan policy think tank the Atlantic Council has called for the United States to make public a detailed account of the results of each strike, including any collateral deaths. 4. In Afghanistan, civilians who have been harmed by US military action can be compensated. There is currently no program in place to compensate civilians who have been harmed by CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, although according to the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Congress has already authorized and appropriated money that could be used for this purpose. The (then-acting) US ambassador to Pakistan acknowledged that there was no reason in principle the United States couldn't do this; it was just a question of setting up a program and implementing it. Congress could indicate to the administration that it wants to see such a program in place. The existence of such a program would create an official address for civilian complaints and a public mechanism for adjudicating those complaints. It would also force the creation of a public count of civilian casualties and civilian harm. 5. Four of the "signatures" that the United States has reported to be using to target "signature" drone strikes (as opposed to "personality" strikes on known persons) are clearly illegal under international law: "Military-Age Male in Area of Known Terrorist Activity," "Consorting with Known Militants," "Armed Men Traveling in Trucks in AQAP-Controlled Area," and "Suspicious Camp in AQ-Controlled Area." (AQAP stands for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.) Congress could press the administration to say whether it is doing these things, and pressure the administration to stop doing them. Ending these signature strikes could be a price imposed for confirmation of the next CIA head.

#### Perm do both - Structural criticism of drones is important, but regulation is key

Rothenberg 13 (Daniel Rothenberg is a professor of practice at the School of Politics and Global Studies, ASU and the Lincoln fellow for Ethics and International Human Rights Law. He is editing a book with Peter Bergen on drones to be published later this year. “What the Drone Debate Is Really About” http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\_tense/2013/05/drones\_in\_the\_united\_states\_what\_the\_debate\_is\_really\_about.html)

The term drone draws attention, elicits passions, and sparks heated discussions. Often the debate about drones flattens the complexity of real policy issues as the questions asked demand impossible answers, “Are drones good or bad?” or “Are you for or against drones?” Not surprisingly, thuis approach heightens the tensions attached to debate about drones, turning conversations into arguments and echoing the polarization that characterizes so much of contemporary political discourse. The intensity of interest in drones arose some years after they became a key element of U.S. military operations abroad. Interestingly, after more than a decade at war, drones remain the only military system within an extraordinarily advanced arsenal to have captivated popular attention. And they have done so at a time when the public has grown weary of war and the deep confusions surrounding the objectives, value, and purpose of these conflicts. For many within the military, the intensity of the debate about drones in combat has been perplexing. As they often point out, drones are simply one of a number of military platforms upon which information-gathering technology or weapons are deployed. For tactical purposes, it may make little difference whether a Hellfire missile is launched from a fighter jet or a drone. And, as military experts and knowledgeable observers emphasize, drones do not operate independently—rather, they are part of a complex, multilayered system in which particular technologies, drones and others, are useful only as integrated within a larger strategic vision. That said, much of the discussion of drones focuses not on their use by the military within defined war zones, where domestic and international law applies, but rather to their use by the CIA and other organizations in places where the legality of their deployment is under question, where data are minimal and where secrecy prevails. In this way, covert drone strikes are the latest in a series of interrelated issues—including torture, black sites, and extraordinary rendition—that reflect directly on the meaning, impact, and ethics of U.S. strategy (once called the global war on terror). Yet, even as drones are linked to existing questions of the appropriateness, legitimacy, and potential illegality of U.S. action, they are the only element of this critique linked to advanced technology, with its complex evocation of promise and danger. Drones have become the iconic public image of the U.S. government’s international projection of military force, during a complex and uncertain time when support is waning and there is great confusion as to the purpose of these ongoing conflicts. More recently, public debate on drones has turned to their current and potential use within our country. And, in this context as well, drones have produced tense discussions about multiple issues including protecting privacy, respecting core constitutional rights, and enabling potential abuses of state power. In response, there are demands for increased regulation as well as concerns that new rules will have a profoundly negative effect on our society. Many worry that the use of drones in our country will usher in a new era of intrusive state surveillance and may even be used as a means of attacking and killing American citizens here at home. For those who currently use drones or advocate for their expanded deployment—whether for military or civilian applications—these debates are deeply frustrating. They point out that drones are simply machines, neither good nor bad, not the sort of issue for which one should seek either support or rejection. They point to drones’ capacity to safely, effectively and inexpensively fight fires, monitor weather patterns, spray crops, and provide ongoing real-time information on hundreds of issues. This is why there is an ongoing effort to shift the language of the debate by replacing the popular term drone with one of a number of arguably more accurate—and less politically loaded—alternatives including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Still, drone remains the default term and will be for the foreseeable future. In fact, the lure and power of the word drone provides insight into the true nature and intensity of the debate. Drones have come to us from foreign battlefields and migrated to the domestic policy environment. While drones may be simple and varied machines, the ones we know best bear names that suggest both danger and brutality, the Predator (MQ-1) and the Reaper (MQ-9). Drones embody the glory of American technological superiority and innovation (at least for now) and appear to many as an ideal tool for facing a difficult, distant, and elusive enemy. Yet, woven into their usefulness abroad is a sense that they are the first expressions of a new reality defined by multiple related technologies whose transformative capacities are as dangerous here as they have been proved to be abroad. Drones captivate us. Their sleekly disturbing look, an odd combination of the fragile and the deadly, produces both fascination and fear. The word drone highlights these qualities, depicting a machine that is solitary, potentially autonomous, ever present, and quietly menacing. The truth is that those who suggest that public debate needs to focus clearly on what drones really are and really do, are missing the point. Facts alone will not resolve the heated discussions. Rather the idea of drones and the resulting questions, complex and varied as they are, are enmeshed in powerful narratives of fear and mistrust as drones have become a central element of the contemporary American political imagination. The drone debate is not only about targeted killings abroad or potential invasions of privacy at home; it is about how this emerging technology has come to symbolize the disorder, threat, uncertainty, and fear of our rapidly changing world. The challenge we face as a society is not simply how to regulate drones (which is clearly necessary) but rather how to learn from the passions they inspire such that we connect serious policy debate on emerging technologies with a respect and acknowledgement for the very real fears of so many.

#### Signature strikes reinforce biopolitical control of life based on behavioral patterns-

**Shaw ’13** [Dr. Ian G.R. Shaw, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University at Glasgow, has written extensively on US drone policy and its geopolitical implications, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” <http://wp.vcu.edu/hsep/files/2013/06/predator-drones.pdf>]

In this section I explore how “life” is the target for the Predator Empire.¶ Although I do not want to downplay the role the American military plays in¶ coordinating and performing violence across the globe, my focus is on the¶ CIA’s drone wars because the evidence from the NSC and DSG suggests a¶ diffuse (if by no means singular) drift towards the droniﬁcation of national¶ security. So too does the National Counterterrorism Center’s disposition¶ matrix and John Brennan’s “playbook”66 establish a permanent precedent for¶ extrajudicial strikes that exist outside of Title 10 authorities.67 This means that¶ the CIA will in all likelihood remain heavily invested in targeted killings for¶ decades to come, despite 9/11 Commission recommendations that paramilitary activities are transferred to the Department of Defense.68 The agency’s¶ 2,000-strong Counterterrorist Center has transformed itself from an intelligence gathering machine to a major player in “kinetic operations”.69 But¶ who counts as a “target” is at times ambiguous. As I previously explored in¶ the above NSS and NSC, there is a deliberate widening of the net surrounding who counts as an afﬁliate. If, as Dillon and Reid suggest, “The history of¶ security is a history of the changing problematisation of what it is to be a¶ political subject and politically subject”,70 then the discursive baptism of the¶ afﬁliate marks a new, if not unprecedented political subject. This is further¶ complicated because afﬁliates are not always identiﬁable individuals such as¶ an al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan. Instead, and as I will argue in the¶ remainder of this section, afﬁliates can be threatening patterns of life that are¶ coded, catalogued, and eliminated.¶ As the name directly implies, targeted killings usually involve a known¶ target. In February 2011, John Rizzo, the 63-year-old former General Counsel of the CIA, discussed the agency’s practice of targeted killings.71 Analysts and¶ “targeters” located in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center select individuals for¶ “neutralization” based on intelligence reports. This report must then clear a¶ team of lawyers before it is signed off by the Counsel. But this isn’t always¶ the normal bureaucratic practice. In the summer of 2008, former CIA Director¶ Michael Hayden successfully lobbied President Bush to dispense with drone¶ targeting constraints that were restricted to known individuals72: “For the ﬁrst¶ time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’¶ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al Qaeda¶ safe house, was enough to authorize a strike”.73 The devil here is in the¶ detail. Unlike “personality strikes”, where the person’s identity is located on¶ one of the CIA’s classiﬁed kill lists or the disposition matrix, a signature is¶ constructed from observing and cataloguing a pattern of life – coding the¶ behaviour and geography of individuals; targeting their very lifeworld.¶ This new targeting regime may have led to a rapid escalation of drone¶ strikes and an increase of the number of people that were killed in Pakistan.¶ Between 2004 and 2007 there were 9 drone attacks, but between the pivot¶ year of 2008 and 2012, this ﬁgure leapt to over three hundred.74 In Table 1,¶ I have calculated the percentages of militant “leaders” killed in drone strikes¶ in order to illustrate the decreasing number of high-level “commanders” that¶ are subject to the CIA’s strikes. While this in itself does not prove that personality strikes have given way to signature killings, it does at least suggest¶ the widening net of those subject to drone attacks in Pakistan.¶ To illustrate how easily innocent civilians can get caught up in a signature strike, recall the 2010 CIVIC report once again. In one story, the Taliban¶ visited the residence of a man named Daud Khan and demanded lunch. The father reluctantly consented, fearing reprisal if he refused the ﬁghters:¶ “The very next day our house was hit... . My only son Khaliq was killed.¶ I saw his body, completely burned”. In this case, it seems that Khan’s son¶ had unwittingly become “afﬁliated” with the Taliban. Due to the unavoidable¶ intermingling of such militants with the lives of ordinary people, it is likely¶ that signature strikes could have killed many innocent people. According to¶ the 2012 Stanford and NYU report, a signature strike probably took place on¶ March 17, 2011. The CIA ﬁred at least two missiles into a large gathering –¶ a jirga led by a decorated public servant – near a bus depot in the town¶ of Datta Khel, North Waziristan. The US insists that all were militants. And¶ yet, the overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the 42 people killed¶ were civilians.75 Of the four suspected Taliban militants identiﬁed by the¶ Associated Press in this strike, only one has ever been identiﬁed by name.¶ As a 2011 Washington Post report notes, “Independent information about¶ who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is scarce”.76 Other ofﬁcials¶ in the US State Department have complained that the classiﬁed criteria used¶ by the CIA to construct a “signature” are too lax: “The joke was that when the¶ CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it’s a terrorist¶ training camp”.77¶ Of course, drones continue to target known individuals on kill lists,¶ performing a well-rehearsed “reduction of places and people to an abstract¶ space”,78 but at least since 2008 the Predator Empire has enforced a distinctive twist on a biopolitical logic based on targeting patterns of life.¶ While there is much variation on what counts as biopolitics,79 it was a term¶ ﬁrst coined by Michel Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the¶ Collège de France,¶ 80 a series that Chris Philo describes as the “decisive hinge”¶ in Foucault’s “switch from being a critical historian of the body to being¶ the critical historian of population”.81 In classical theories of sovereignty,¶ the sovereign can “either have people put to death or let them live”,82 and¶ its power over life “is exercised only when the sovereign can kill”.83 This¶ sovereign power became supplemented by a new “right to make live and¶ let die”84 in the nineteenth century. This transformation involved a shift from¶ disciplinary technologies that targeted “man-as-body” (what Foucault calls¶ an “anatomo-politics”) to regulatory mechanisms at the level of “man-asspecies” (what Foucault calls a “biopolitics”). Biological processes such as¶ fertility rates became political problems and sites of intervention, where the¶ aim was to “establish a sort of homeostasis”85 within the population which¶ “consists in making live and letting die” and “achieving an overall equilibrium¶ that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers”.86 All of which¶ might be termed “State control of the biological”.87

**Perm do the plan and embrace narratives of veterans**

#### Extinction outweighs - Nuclear war would result in massive political repression, turns their K advantage.

Martin 02 (Brian, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, “Activism after nuclear war?,” Published by TFF (Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research), March, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/02tff.html)

In the event of nuclear war, as well as death and destruction there will be serious political consequences. Social activists should be prepared. ¶ The confrontation between Indian and Pakistani governments earlier this year showed that military use of nuclear weapons is quite possible. There are other plausible scenarios. A US military attack against Iraq could lead Saddam Hussein to release chemical or biological weapons, providing a trigger for a US nuclear strike. Israeli nuclear weapons might also be unleashed. Another possibility is accidental nuclear war.¶ Paul Rogers in his book Losing Control says that the risk of nuclear war has increased due to proliferation, increased emphasis on nuclear war-fighting, reduced commitment to arms control (especially by the US government) and Russian reliance on nuclear arms as its conventional forces disintegrate.¶ A major nuclear war could kill hundreds of millions of people. But less catastrophic outcomes are possible. A limited exchange might kill "only" tens or hundreds of thousands of people. Use of nuclear "bunker-busters" might lead to an immediate death toll in the thousands or less.¶ Nuclear war would also lead to increased political repression. Martial law might be declared. Activists would be targeted for surveillance or arrest. Dissent would become even riskier. War always brings restraints on civil liberties.¶ The political aftermath of September 11 - increased powers for police forces and spy agencies, increased intolerance of and controls over political dissent - is just a taste of what would be in store in the aftermath of nuclear war.¶ Being prepared for nuclear war is not defeatism but realism. Indeed, being prepared may make nuclear war less likely, as I argued 20 years ago in an article titled "How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war". Many of the points I made then are just as relevant today.

#### An informed and outraged citizenry is the best check on aggressive presidential powers- empirics prove it literally ends wars

**Druck ‘12** [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

There are obvious similarities between the causes and effects of¶ the public scrutiny associated with the larger wars discussed above. In¶ each situation, the United States was faced with some, or even all, of¶ the traditional costs associated with war: a draft, an increasingly large¶ military industry, logistical sacrifices (such as rationing and other¶ noncombat expenses), and significant military casualties.114 Americans looking to keep the United States out of foreign affairs obviously¶ had a great deal on the line, which provided sufficient incentive to¶ scrutinize military policy. In the face of these potentially colossal¶ harms, the public was willing to assert a significant voice, which in¶ turn increased the willingness of politicians to challenge and subsequently shift presidential policy. As a result, public scrutiny and activism placed a President under constant scrutiny in one war, delayed¶ U.S. intervention in another, and even helped end two wars entirely.¶ Thus, we may extract a general principle from these events: when¶ faced with the prospect of a war requiring heavy domestic sacrifices,¶ and absent an incredibly compelling reason to engage in such a war¶ (as seen in World War II, for example),115 the public is properly incentivized to emerge and exert social (and, consequently, political)¶ pressure in order to engage and shift foreign policy. However, as we¶ will see, the converse is true as well.

## 1AR

#### Current drone policy breeds apathy and ensures public and legal disengagement- this makes war a spectacle rather than a reality and justifies endless interventions

**Druck ‘12** [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and¶ therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand,¶ the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit,124¶ as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that,¶ we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to¶ identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has¶ “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it¶ into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens¶ sharing in its importance.”125 As a result, the American public has¶ slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians¶ at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy.126¶ In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring¶ public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose¶ own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to¶ public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez,¶ where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because¶ the mission was perceived to be a success.128 Yet we can imagine that¶ most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to¶ worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying¶ another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success,129 we can expect even¶ less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements¶ are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this¶ respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime.¶ Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven¶ warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the¶ President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect¶ him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely¶ totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces.131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces,¶ which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have¶ generally complied with domestic law.132¶ The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers¶ for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam¶ War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a¶ drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive¶ to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134